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THE NATIONAL RESERVE SYSTEM AND 
TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS: IS THE 
NEW JERSEY PINE LANDS PLAN AN 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL "TAKING"? 
Ellen M. Randle* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The New Jersey Pinelands (Pinelands) contains "about one million 
acres of pristine pine oak forest, cedar bogs and wetlands and exten-
sive ground and surface water resources of high quality which pro-
vide a unique habitat for a wide diversity of rare, threatened and en-
dangered plant and animal species."l This ecologically-sensitive area 
is set in the midst of the country's most densely populated region.2 
Located in the southeast portion of the state, the Pinelands covers 
20 percent of New Jersey's land mass3 and is larger than the state of 
Rhode Island.4 As the last, vast, untouched expanse in the northeast, 
this "environmental treasure"5 is in danger of being whittled away 
by the intense development pressures confronting southern New 
Jersey. The suburbanization of Philadelphia in the west and the re-
cent phenomenon of casino gambling in the east pose a particularly 
substantial threat to the Pinelands.6 In response to these pressures, 
a massive and sustained regional planning effort is needed before 
* Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1. Amicus Curiae Brief of the State of New Jersey at 7, San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City 
of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981). 
2. THE PINELANDS COMM'N, COMPREHENSIVE MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE PINE LANDS 
NATIONAL RESERVE (NATIONAL PARKS & RECREATION ACT, 1978) AND PINE LANDS AREA (NEW 
JERSEY PINELANDS PROTECTION ACT, 1979) xvii (1980) [hereinafter cited as CMPj. 
3. Amicus Curiae Brief for the State of New Jersey at 7, San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. 
City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981). 
4. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1981, at B6, col. 1. 
5. CMP, supra note 2, at xvii. 
6. Id., pt. 1, at 161. 
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scattered and piecemeal development inflicts irreparable damage on 
water quantity and quality, and on the region's existing, unique 
character. 7 
Proposals for the preservation of the Pine Barrens8 were devised 
and discussed at the local, state, and federal levels for several 
decades,9 without success. Finally, in November, 1978, the national 
interest in protecting and preserving this unique resource prompted 
action, as Congress enacted the National Parks and Recreation 
Act,IO establishing the Pinelands as the country's first National 
Reserve. The National Reserve concept foregoes the traditional 
route of outright federal acquisition and management of entire 
areas. Instead, this new approach combines limited public acquisition 
with comprehensive land use controls developed and implemented 
through a cooperative program involving local, state, and federal 
governments, as well as concerned private groups and individuals.ll 
Under this Reserve system, the federal contribution is mostly finan-
cial,12 whereas the state takes the lead in devising and implementing 
effective land use controls. The Reserve system, therefore, allows a 
state to address its major environmental concerns and to responsibly 
plan for the future on a regional scale without being subject to its 
own financial limitations. 
In June, 1979, the New Jersey Legislature supplemented the 
federal law by passing the Pinelands Protection Act,13 endorsing the 
Reserve system and further enunciating the means for its implemen-
tation. A regional master plan14 was formulated by the Pinelands 
Commission-the statutorily-createdl5 planning body also responsi-
ble for the mandatory implementation of the plan.16 Essentially, the 
regional plan is divided along geographical lines into two distinct 
development schemes. In the remote interior of the Pinelands (the 
Preservation Area),17 zoning and regulation under the plan prohibit 
7. Id. See generally J. MCPHEE, THE PINE BARRENS (1968). 
8. The "Pine Barrens" is another name commonly used when referring. to the Pinelands. 
"Pinelands" and "Pine Barrens" will be used interchangeably throughout this article. 
9. STATE ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE STATEMENT, SENATE, No. 3091-L 1979, c. 
111, reprinted in N. J. REV. STAT. S 13:18A-1 (Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as STATE ENERGY 
& ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE STATEMENT]. 
10. National Parks & Recreation Act of 1978, S 502, 16 U.S.C. § 471i (Supp. III 1979). 
11. STATE ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE STATEMENT, supra note 9. 
12. 16 U.S.C. S 471i(k) (Supp. III 1979) authorizes appropriations of up to $26 million to 
carry out the plan, with no more than $3 million to be available for planning. 
13. Pinelands Protection Act, N.J. REV. STAT. SS 13:18A-1 to 13:18A-29 (Supp. 1980). 
14. See CMP, supra note 2. 
15. 16 U.S.C. S 471i(d) (Supp. III 1979); N.J. REV. STAT. S 13:18A-4 (Supp. 1980). 
16. N.J. REV. STAT. S 13:18A-9 (Supp. 1980). 
17. For a brief description of the Preservation Area, see infra text and notes at notes 
115-18. 
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virtually all new development;18 whereas, in the outer ring of the 
Pinelands (the Protection Area),19 less stringent zoning regulations 
direct future development into those areas where the environmental 
effect will be minimal. 20 The Pinelands Commission has attempted 
through this plan to fulfill its legislative mandate by "use of [s ]tate 
and local police power responsibilities to the greatest extent prac-
ticable."21 Landowners upset with restrictions imposed by the plan's 
implementation, however, have already gone to the courts22 with 
their claims that the regulations have "go[ne] too far"23 and that a 
"taking"24 has occurred in violation of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments to the United States Constitution.26 
One particularly innovative aspect of the Pinelands Plan is the use 
of "transferable development credits"26 to alleviate any personal 
hardship caused to landowners in the most strictly regulated areas. 
Those landowners who can no longer develop their property may ef-
fectively sever their unusable development rights from the land and 
sell them as credits on the open market. Landowners who purchase 
these Pinelands Development Credits27 may then apply them to 
property in designated areas, thereby enabling the owner to develop 
his land at a greater level than would normally be allowed.28 Through 
this sale of development rights, the strictly regulated landowner may 
18. The Pinelands Comm'n, A Summary of the Pinelands Plan, DRAFT (Feb. 6, 1981) 
[hereinafter cited as DRAFT Summary]. 
19. For a brief description of the Protection Area, see infra text and notes at notes 119·21. 
20. DRAFT Summary, supra note 18, at 9. 
21. 16 U.S.C. S 471i(f)(3)(B) (Supp. III 1979); N.J. REV. STAT. S 13: 18A-8(d)(2) (Supp. 1980). 
22. See, e.g., Hovsons, Inc. v. Sec'y of the Interior of the United States, No. 81-97, slip op. 
(D.N.J. July 14,1981); Orleans Builders and Developers v. Byrne, No. A-503-80T3 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div., filed July, 1980) (appeal of decision of Pinelands Commission). 
23. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
24. See infra Section IV for a detailed discussion of the judicial interpretation of the term 
"taking." 
25. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution states in relevant part that "[n]o 
private property [shall] be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. 
amend. V, cl. 4. 
The relevant portion of the fourteenth amendment states that "[n]o State shall ... 
deprive any person of ... property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 
S1. 
26. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 210-12. This article will discuss transferable development 
credits in detail at section III infra. 
27. "Pinelands Development Credits" is the official term assigned to the transferable 
development rights created by the Pinelands Plan. See CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 210-12. 
28. [d. at 210. If an owner of strictly regulated land also owns land in an area designated for 
development, he has the option of simply transferring the development credits from one parcel 
to the other, thereby gaining the additional development potential himself. 
To supplement this simplistic description of transferable development credits, see the de-
tailed discussion at Section III infra. 
186 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:183 
share in the increasing value of those parcels of land which are not 
restricted to the same severe degree.29 
For years, commentators have espoused the usefulness of trans-
ferable development rights30 as a tool to preserve landmarks31 and 
open spaces32 without "taking" the property from its owners. Yet, 
the Pinelands Plan is the first attempt to apply the transferable 
development right (TDR) concept on any significant scale. As such, 
this ambitious plan raises numerous legal issues. The most important 
issues-those relevant to the future successful utilization of both the 
TDR and National Reserve concepts-are those to be considered and 
resolved in this article: namely, (1) whether TDR's are in themselves 
unconstitutional, as one oft-cited commentator argues;33 (2) whether 
TDR's as specifically applied in the Pinelands are unconstitutional; 
and (3) whether the Pinelands Plan as a whole, or in part, results in 
the unconstitutional "taking" of the regulated land. 
In analyzing these issues and the regulatory scheme as a whole, 
this article will first discuss the master plan in order to convey the 
ecological significance of the Pinelands and the ambitiousness of the 
goals, policies, and procedures devised to protect the region. Second, 
this article will examine fully the concept of transferable develop-
ment rights and the mechanics of the Pinelands Development Credit 
system. Third, this article will analyze relevant case law on the "tak-
ing" issue and sketch the contours of the test which courts apply 
when evaluating whether a "taking" has occurred. Finally, the arti-
cle will apply this "taking" test to the Pinelands regulatory scheme 
to determine how the Pinelands Plan, and the Pinelands Develop-
ment Credit system, should fare under judicial scrutiny. 
II. THE PINE LANDS COMPREHENSIVE MANAGEMENT PLAN 
To place the Pinelands Comprehensive Management Plan in the 
proper perspective, one must look behind the Plan to its inspiration 
29. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 210. 
30. The terms "transferable development rights" and "transferable developmtmt credits" 
differ little in meaning and will be used interchangeably throughout this article. 
31. See, e.g., J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFr: SAVING URBAN LANDMARKS THROUGH THE CmCAGO 
PLAN (1974); Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 372 
(1971); Elliott & Marcus, From Euclid to Ramapo: New Directions In Land Development Con-
trols, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 56 (1973). 
32. See, e.g., J. COSTONIS & R. DEVOY, THE PUERTO RICO PLAN: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION THROUGH DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFER (1974); THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT 
RIGHTS: A NEW TECHNIQUE OF LAND USE REGULATION (J. Rose ed. 1975); Rose, A Proposalfor 
the Separation and Marketability of Development Rights as a Technique to Preserve Open 
Space, 2 REAL ESTATE L. J. 635 (1974). 
33. Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferahle Development Rights, 84 Y ALl~ L. J. 1101 
(1975). 
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-the untouched natural beauty and abundant resources of the 
Pinelands expanse set in the midst of the most urbanized state in the 
union.34 The national interest in preserving the Pinelands stands in 
contrast to the regional need to provide for the inevitable future 
development of southern New Jersey.36 The resulting Pinelands 
Plan is an attempt to accommodate both of these interests. The land 
use regulations devised under the Plan allow for development in 
those areas where the land is capable of supporting it with minimal 
damage to the environment; whereas, where the environmental ef-
fect would be great, development is prohibited. 36 
A. The Pine lands-Its Resources and Factors 
Influencing Those Resources 
1. Natural Resources and Land Use 
The Pinelands is a "unique and self-maintaining ecosystem"37 
which has evolved over thousands of years. The most important 
abiotic element in this ecosystem is water, stored in the extensive 
sand aquifers38 below the surface and replenished solely by precipita-
tion.39 The most important water aquifer in the Pinelands-the 
Cohansey4o-alone has been estimated to store as much as 17 trillion 
gallons.41 The water, vast and plentiful, also remains bacterially 
sterile, odorless, and clear.42 These fresh water aquifers are highly 
susceptible to pollution, however ~ as the uppermost soil is chemically 
inert and therefore incapable of filtering out waste;43 also, the com-
34. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 11 (101st ed. 1980). 
35. See infra Section II(AX2). 
36. For the specific regulatory provisions set out in the Plan, see infra Section II(C). 
37. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 6. 
38. An aquifer is defined as U[a] geological formation or layer of material that is porous or 
permeable to water, thus capable of containing or carrying ground water. Sometimes the term 
is restricted to those formations actually containing water." 7 C. DAVIS, H. COBLENTZ & O. 
TITELBAUM, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 273 (R. Clark ed. 1976). 
39. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 12. 
40. The Cohansey aquifer lies below the eastern coastal plain, a large area which includes 
the eastern coast and southern portion of the state. See id. at 14. 
41. Id. John McPhee most impressively described the immenseness of the Pinelands water 
supply: 
[U]nder the pines is a natural reservoir of pure water that, in volume, is the 
equivalent of a lake seventy-five feet deep with a surface of a thousand square 
miles. If all the impounding reservoirs, storage reservoirs, and distribution 
reservoirs in the New York City water system were filled to capacity . . . the 
Pine Barrens aquifer would still contain thirty times as much water. 
J. McPHEE, supra note 7, at 13. 
42. J. MCPHEE, supra note 7, at 13. See also CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 16. 
43. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 12. 
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position of the water itself44 renders it a weak buffer against 
chemical change.45 Particular land use activities in localized areas 
are already beginning to have an effect on the groundwater aquifers 
and streams of the Pinelands.46 Thus, the actual or potential pollu-
tion sources associated with development-septic tanks, landfills, 
and chemical and industrial waste dumping, for example-pose an 
immediate and severe threat to individual localities and to the entire 
regionY 
The soils of the Pinelands on the whole are unusually porous and 
acid, and have a relatively low capacity to retain both water and 
nutrients.48 As such, the soil tends not to produce vegetation of the 
garden variety. Rather, the soil composition is responsible for the 
less common vegetation which is characteristic of the Pinelands, 
such as the thousands of acres of dwarf pines no taller than a 
person.49 In addition, the Pinelands soil is significant because of the 
variation in its composition throughout the region. The composition 
of the soil directly influences land use patterns in the region since 
certain land uses, such as farming, are better suited to certain types 
of soils.50 
Just as water levels and soil composition have helped to shape the 
landscape of the Pinelands, so have two other interrelated elements 
of more recent origin: fire and human disturbance. 51 The Pinelands 
area has shown a remarkable propensity to recover from the ravages 
of fire;52 yet, not without certain effects. The distribution of plants 
shifts according to their susceptibility to fire damage; as the pattern 
of vegetation changes, so do the animal communities living nearby. 53 
How far this ecological system can be pushed by fire before certain 
plant and animal species disappear entirely from the Pinelands is an 
44. This is a matter too complex for this writer to attempt to explain. However, for details, 
see id. at 15-16. 
45. Id. at 15. 
46. Id. at 18. 
47. Id. at 16. 
48. Id. at 40. 
49. See J. MCPHEE, supra note 7, at 2; Roberts, Don't Call It 'the Barrens,' AUDUBON, July, 
1981, at 77. 
50. eMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 43. 
51. Id. at 4-6. 
52. Id. at 4. See also J. McPHEE, supra note 7, at 116-37. The worst fire in Pinelands history 
demonstrates the seriousness of this problem. The fire, which occurred in April, 1963, 
destroyed 183,000 acres, 186 homes and 197 out-buildings, and killed 7 persons. The estimated 
property loss exceeded 8.5 million dollars. eMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 67. As to the frequency 
of fires, although official statistics were unavailable, one estimate is that there are about 400 
forest fires in the Pinelands every year, with 15 to 20 of them considered to be major. Id. at 
121. 
53. eMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 4. 
1982] NEW JERSEY PINE LANDS 189 
unanswered question. This is a matter of concern at present because 
increased development in recent years has greatly increased the 
human risk factor and fire potential. 54 
Other human disturbances have been kept to a minimum, as the ex-
plosive population growth which has occurred in New Jersey since 
the mid-1800's did not press on the Pinelands until the last two 
decades.55 Timbering, hunting, drainage oflowlands, and the advent 
of intensive recreation, pollution, and pest control are a few ex-
amples of activities which, on a small scale, affect but will not 
destroy the character of the Pinelands.56 However, as is true of scat-
tered and piecemeal housing development which interferes with the 
continuity of the landscape,57 an increase in intensity of these ac-
tivities will ultimately have a drastic and destructive effect. 58 
The distinctive character of the Pinelands landscape-a product of 
interacting environmental factors such as water, soil, fire and 
human disturbances59-is defined by the vegetation and wildlife. 
Pinelands vegetation includes more than 850 species of plants, 580 of 
them being native species.60 Seventy-two of these species currently 
face extinction in the Pinelands.61 In addition, the Pinelands con-
tains 299 species of birds, 59 reptile and amphibian species, 91 fish 
species, and 35 species of mammals.62 Included are two species listed 
as endangered under federal standards63 and 32 listed as threatened 
or endangered by the State of New Jersey.64 The area is also "ex-
tremely rich"65 with insects, as approximately 10,000 species reside 
in the region.66 
Historically, the Pinelands have been utilized for such resources as 
lumber and forest products, bog iron, hydropower, sand for glass-
making, and berries for commercial marketingY Current land use 
does not break with tradition.68 Forest and wetland areas support 
54. Illustrative of a dangerous trend is that, in the five-year period from 1974 to 1978, the 
majority of wildfires occurred around developed areas. Id. at 67. 
55. Id. at 6. 
56. Id. at 4-5. 
57.Id. 
58. See id. 
59. Id. at 58. 
60.Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 76, 78. 
63. Id. at 76. 
64. Id. Certain species, such as the black bear, wolf, heath hen, and native turkey have 
already been eliminated by hunters. Id. at 5. 
65. Id. at 88 (citation omitted). 
66.Id. 
67. Id. at 97,124-26. 
68. Excluding the recent advent of retirement community development and casino gam-
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such activities as timber and mineral extraction, hunting and gather-
ing, as well as all types of recreation.69 Agricultural lands yield food 
crops, fruits and vegetables, and berries, particularly cranberries 
and blueberries.7o That land within the Pine Barrens which has been 
developed is almost exclusively devoted to residential uses.71 That 
commercial development which does exist is primarily limited to 
small businesses, services, and retail trade along roadways. 72 
The extensive use of the land and its resources as a way of life is 
generally associated with older cultures. 73 Yet, until recent years, 
the long-time residents of the Pinelands-the "Pineys," as they call 
themselves-were almost totally dependent on the resources of their 
land. Although most rural residents now also hold jobs unrelated to 
the land, these people have retained their underlying traditional in-
dependent attitude and self-sufficient lifestyle.74 The Pine Barrens, 
for the rural residents, is still a place where "nobody bothers you" 
and "you can be alone."75 
Unfortunately for those rural inhabitants who desire solitude, the 
population of the Pinelands region has been rising steadily since 
1950.76 Although this is consistent with the historical trend of steady 
growth in southern New Jersey in general, the bulk of the population 
increase has shifted inward from the non-Pinelands areas (the 
eastern coast and the area immediately surrounding Philadelphia) 
bling in Atlantic City, discussed infra, Section II(AX2). 
69. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 128. Note that a sizeable acreage of forest and wetlands are 
publicly owned and held by state and local land management agencies. Some 48,000 acres of 
land are devoted to military and aviation facilities. Id. 
70. Id. Berry agriculture is a major aspect of the Pinelands culture and character. Berries 
have been cultivated there for the past century and a half. New Jersey ranks third nationally in 
cranberry production, with 3000 acres of bogs; 7800 acres are committed to the production of 
blueberries. Both berries depend on high-quality acidic water in large volumes, making their 
cultivation perfectly compatible with the character of the Pinelands. Id. at 130-3l. 
71. There are only Hi major industrial employers of more than 100 workers in the Pinelands 
region, compared to nearly 4000 in New Jersey as a whole. Id. at 128. 
72_ Id. at 129. The largest employers in the Pinelands are the four federal military and avia-
tion facilities: Fort Dix; McGuire Air Force Base; Lakehurst Naval Air Station; and Federal 
Aviation Administration Technical Center. Further employment is provided by state facilities, 
namely a state college, a hospital, and a prison. Id. at 148-50. 
73. Id. at 108. 
74. Id. See generally J. McPHEE, supra note 7; Roberts, Don't Call It 'the Barrens,' 
AUDUBON, July, 1981, at 77. 
75. J. MCPHEE, supra note 7, at 59. 
76. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 161. In 1950, the Pinelands population was approximately 
118,000. By 1970, the population had more than doubled. Currently, the population of the 
Pinelands Reserve is estimated at 323,000. Id. 
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toward the heart of the Pinelands.77 The perimeter is slowly being 
whittled away.78 
2. Development Threats 
The development pressure within the Pinelands is not linked to in-
ternal employment growth, as there has been no significant surge of 
economic activity in the area. 79 Rather, a substantial part of the past 
and present residential development is linked to economic activity 
outside its borders. The continuing expansion of the suburban ring 
around Philadelphia has exerted development pressures on the 
northwestern edge of the Pinelands. Likewise, on the eastern 
periphery looms the recent resurgence of Atlantic City as a center of 
economic activity founded on casino gambling and the resulting serv-
ice needs of the gambling populace.80 A third major source of 
development pressure is unrelated to economic activity. Rather, the 
peaceful setting and affordable acreage along the northeastern edge 
of the Pinelands has attracted a large number of retirees and large-
scale retirement communities. 81 
The Pinelands counties situated closest to the Greater Philadelphia 
Area-Burlington, Camden, and Gloucester counties-have ex-
perienced a steady and significant increase in the construction of 
homes.82 However, there has been little parallel activity in the pur-
chase of vacant land.83 This means that current growth is being ac-
commodated by gradu.ally developing land already held for the pur-
poses of development or investment.84 This development is occur-
ring in the fringe area immediately outside the Reserve boundaries, 
as well as within the borders of the Pinelands communities them-
selves.85 
77. In the 1960's, the Pinelands municipalities accounted for 29 percent of the total 
Southern New Jersey population growth. In the 1970's, this percentage had jumped to more 
than 50 percent. [d. at 162. 
78. [d. at 165. 
79. [d. at 164. See supra text at note 71. 
80. eMF, supra note 2, pt. I at 164,175-78. 
81. [d. at 165, 170-71. 
82. [d. at 168-69. Note that many of the counties discussed in these pages are not totally 
contained within the Pinelands Reserve. 
83. [d. 
84. [d. Land market activity in the Pinelands was very active in the early 1970's, peaking in 
1973, and thereafter sharply declining for several years. Although the market had not fully 
recovered by 1978, recent figures show a steady increase in the dollar value of land transac-
tions since 1975. [d. at 165. 
85. [d. at 167. 
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The situation is quite different in the Pinelands counties situated 
on the eastern shore near Atlantic City-Atlantic and Gape May 
Counties.86 These counties have experienced high levels of vacant 
land transactions in the past several years; yet, this active sale of 
land has not been reflected in housing production.87 Presumably, 
therefore, the recently purchased land is being held speculatively, to 
be sold or developed sometime in the future. The bulk of land trans-
actions have occurred in those parts of the counties closest in prox-
imity to Atlantic City and therefore technically outside of the 
Pinelands region. This land sale increase is occurring, however, in 
the Pinelands portions as well.88 
Just how much employment, population, and housing growth will 
be triggered by casino-gambling development in Atlantic City is "the 
most significant unknown [variable] in the entire regional develop-
ment picture."89 Experts disagree among themselves (and from day 
to day) as to their projections.90 One estimate91 predicts that casino 
and casino-related jobs92 will employ 133,600 persons by 1985 and 
165,600 by 1990.93 Secondary employment generated by the 
demands of the casinos, hotels, motels and their employees for goods 
and services will affect thousands more throughout the region.94 The 
resulting population increase will trigger an explosive demand for 
housing which clearly cannot be met by the existing level of housing 
production.95 Development pressures of such magnitude could hard-
ly be restricted to Atlantic City proper, but will be felt throughout 
the entire region.96 
At present, the largest land market and center of housing develop-
ment activity in the Pinelands is to the northeast, in Ocean County, 
where there has been a significant influx of senior citizens.97 The ad-
86. [d. at 168-70. 
87. [d. 
88. [d. 
89. [d. at 175. 
90. [d. 
91. This projection is considered to be conservative. See id. at 176, Table 5.14. 
92. Casino-related jobs include those jobs in the casinos, hotels and motels; and eonstructing 
the casinos, hotels and motels. [d. at 176. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. at 176-77. 
95. [d. at 177. Inevitably, the law of supply and demand being what it is, the housing short-
age will particularly affect workers at lower wage levels; an estimated 50 perc€,nt of casino 
workers will fall into this category. Having been "priced out" of the housing market in the 
areas closest to Atlantic City, it is these people who will likely seek the more affordable hous-
ing further inside the Reserve's boundaries. [d. 
96. [d. 
97. [d. at 170. 
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vent of retirement communities has added a new wrinkle to the 
development picture of the Pinelands area. Whereas the gradual 
suburban growth around Philadelphia and the steady expansion of 
Atlantic City have retained a pattern of sorts, the development in 
Ocean County is "far more idiosyncratic and irregular, particularly 
in terms of geographic spread."98 These retirement communities 
have sprung up wherever land is available at a reasonable price. 99 
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that this trend will not con-
tinue, as demographic studies show that the over-age-sixty-five 
population will likely continue to grow until the 1990's.100 The cost to 
the environment of such unrestricted scattered development for 
another decade would be high indeed. 101 
The New Jersey Pinelands is an anachronism-a vast expanse im-
measurably rich in natural resources and as yet untouched by prog-
ress. However, it is only a matter of time before the increased 
residential, commercial, and industrial development of the Pinelands 
periphery affects the entire region. In recognition of this fact, bold 
action was taken to protect the natural wonders of the Pinelands-
the creation of the Pinelands National Reserve. 
B. Legislative and Administrative Origins 
The Pinelands National Reserve was established by federallaw102 
in November, 1979. The Reserve consists of approximately one 
million acres,103 encompassing parts of seven southern New Jersey 
counties and all or parts of fifty-six municipalities. 104 The Act 
authorized the creation of a fifteen-person planning entityl05 to for-
mulate a comprehensive regulatory plan to manage the vast 
reserve. 106 Then-New Jersey Governor Brendan Byrne established 
the Commission through an executive order issued in February, 
1979.107 In addition to creating the Pinelands Planning Commission 
(Pinelands Commission), the Governor's order made most develop-
98. Id. 
99. Eighty percent of all retirement communities in New Jersey are in Ocean County. Id. at 
172. 
100. Id. at 174. 
101. Id. at 161. 
102. National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, § 502, 16 U.S.C. § 471i (Supp. III 1979). 
103. 16 U.S.C. § 471i(c) (Supp. III 1979). 
104. CMP, supra note 2, at xviii. 
105. 16 U.S.C. S 471i(d) (Supp. III 1979). 
106. 16 U.S.C. § 471i(g) (Supp. III 1979). 
107. Exec. Order No. 71 (issued by N.J. Governor Brendan Byrne, Feb. 8, 1979). 
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ment in the Pinelands subject to Commission approval during the 
planning period. 108 
In June, 1979, the New Jersey Legislature supplemented the 
federal law by passing the Pinelands Protection Act.109 The state act 
endorsed the planning effort,l1O the designation of the Pinelands 
Commission as the regional planning entity,l1l and the interim 
restrictions on development. 112 In addition, the act called upon the 
Pinelands Commission to produce a comprehensive management 
plan113 to which county and municipal master plans and land use or-
dinances must conform.114 
The state law differentiates between the remote interior of the 
Pinelands and the surrounding portion.115 The former, known as the 
Preservation Area, consists of 368,000 acres of semiwilderness116 
which is especially vulnerable to environmental degradation. 117 
Therefore, the legislature felt that the area requires highly stringent 
restrictions on the development of land, as well as public aequisition 
of that property requiring a greater degree of protection than 
regulation can provide. 118 The latter is the 566,000-acre Protection 
Area, consisting of somewhat more developed land119 containing a 
"mix of valuable environmental features."120 The legislative man-
108. CMP, supra note 2, at xviii. The original planning period was to be 18 months from the 
receipt of the appropriated federal funds. However, an extension of some four months was 
later granted to allow finalization of portions of the Plan. See id. at xviii-xvix. 
Suit was brought challenging the validity of the provisions of Executive Order No. 71 which 
limited the amount and types of construction which could take place in the Pinelands during 
this interim period. However, the subsequent passage of the Pinelands Protection Act 
rendered moot the question of whether the governor possessed the power to take such action. 
N.J. Builders Ass'n v. Byrne, 80 N.J. 469, 404 A.2d 32 (1979). 
109. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 13:18A-1 to 13:18A-29 (Supp. 1980). 
110. Id. § 13:18A-2. 
111. Id. § 13:18A-4. For state constitutional purposes, the Commission is considered part of 
the Department of Environmental Protection. However, the Act specifies that "the Commis-
sion shall be independent of any supervision or control by such department" and "shall exer-
cise all the powers and duties as may be necessary in order to effectuate the purposes and pro-
visions" of the Act. Id. 
112. Id. § 13:18A-10. 
113. Id. § 13:18A-8. The statute also provides for public hearings on the issue to be held in 
the Pinelands area prior to preparing the CMP; furthermore, periodic revision and updating 
are mandated. Id. 
114. Id. § 13:18A-10. The required county and municipal master plans and land use or-
dinances were to be submitted to the Commission within one year of the adoption of the CMP 
(Nov. 21, 1980).Id. § 13:18A-12. 
115. DRAFT Summary, supra note 18, at 3. 
116. CMP, supra note 2, at xix. 
117. Id., pt. I at 195. 
118. N.J. REV. STAT. § 13:18A-2 (Supp. 1980). 
119. CMP, supra note 2, at xix. 
120. DRAFT Summary, supra note 18, at 3. 
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date with regard to this portion was less clear, leaving the Commis-
sion with greater discretion in devising a plan which would strike a 
balance between the environmental and development interests in-
volved. 121 
In complying with its legislative mandate to formulate a manage-
ment plan, the Pinelands Commission successfully gathered and 
analyzed information on natural, physical, and historic resources; 
sociocultural factors; growth patterns; land management tech-
niques; financial components; as well as other pertinent topics. 122 
Advice and assistance from appropriate officials, interested profes-
sionals, scientific and citizen organizations, as well as input arising 
from a series of public meetings, aided the Commission in forming 
recommendations and identifying issues of concern.123 The end 
result of this intensive and extensive investigation was the comple-
tion of the Comprehensive Management Plan (the Pinelands Plan), 
which was adopted by the Commission in November, 1980; approved 
by Governor Byrne in December, 1980; and given federal approval in 
January, 1981, by then-Secretary of the Interior Cecil Andrus. 124 As 
of the early months of 1982, the Plan is in its implementation 
phase. 125 
The Pinelands Plan, as adopted, is comprised of two parts. Part I 
"describes the region's natural, cultural, and physical resources, the 
factors influencing those resources, and the programs which have 
been developed to respond to the state and federal mandates."126 
Part II contains the "substantive land use programs and develop-
ment standards," providing the specific language to put these pro-
121. Id. at 9. The Pinelands Area-the combined acreage of the Preservation and Protection 
Areas-is approximately 150,000 acres smaller than the Pinelands Reserve as delineated by 
the federal Act. The regulation of this excess 150,000 acres, mostly along the New Jersey 
coast, is outside the State Pinelands Commission's jurisdiction. Development there is gov· 
erned by the Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA), which is required to carry out the 
purposes of the state and federal Pinelands Acts. DRAFT Summary, supra note 18, at 10; 
Roberts, Don't Call It 'the Barrens,' AUDUBON, July, 1981, at 77. 
122. 16 U.S.C. §§ 471i(e), (f) (Supp. III 1979); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 13:18A·6, 13:18A·8 (Supp. 
1980). 
123. CMP, supra note 2, at xxi. 
124. DRAFT Summary, supra note 18, at 3; Hearings on S. 3335 before the Natural 
Resources and Agriculture Comm. of the N.J. Senate 4 (July 7, 1981) (testimony of the Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.) (unpublished) [hereinafter cited as N.R.D.C. Testimony]. 
125. N.R.D.C. Testimony, supra note 124, at 4. The Plan's implementation requires that all 
Pinelands municipalities and counties bring their master plans and land use ordinances into 
conformance with the CMP. The Pinelands Commission is responsible for the review and cer· 
tification of municipal and county plans which are yet incomplete. See CMP, supra note 2, pt. I 
at 273-75. 
126. CMP, supra note 2, at xix-xx. Much of the substantive information contained in Part I 
of the CMP is reflected in the previous section of this article. See supra Section II(A). 
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grams into effect.127 It is the latter which is central to the effort to 
protect the Pinelands-the regulatory program devised to manage 
the Pinelands National Reserve. 
C. The Pine lands Management Program 
The heart of the Pinelands Management Program is the provision 
of an adequate supply of land in those areas best able to accom-
modate new development so as to meet the regional need for hous-
ing. 128 The extensive examination and cataloging of natural re-
sources and of historical, cultural, and economic trends in the Pine-
lands was necessary to determine the "critical areas"12'~-those 
areas deemed by the planners to be most vulnerable to degradation 
by incompatible development.13o The planners then attempted to 
reconcile their findings as to the critical areas with their analyses of 
population and housing demand estimates.131 The desired result of 
the planners' efforts was to satisfy both the environmental and 
development needs of the Pinelands region. 
In formulating its plan, the Pinelands Commission was guided by 
goals set out by the federal and state acts.132 The state Pineland Pro-
tection Act set forth specific goals to be attained in the management 
of the Preservation and Protection Areas.133 The goals for the 
Preservation Area included: the preservation of an extensive and 
contiguous area of land in its natural state; the promotion of com-
patible agricultural, horticultural, and recreational uses; the prohibi-
tion of any construction or development incompatible with preserva-
tion of the area; the provision of a sufficient amount of undeveloped 
land to accommodate particular wilderness management practices; 
and the protection and preservation of the quantity and quality of ex-
isting surface and ground waters.134 With respect to the Protection 
Area, the goals included: the preservation and maintenance of the 
essential character of the existing Pinelands environment; the pro-
tection and maintenance of the quality of surface and ground waters; 
the promotion of the continuation and expansion of agricultural and 
127. CMP, supra note 2, at xx. 
128. [d. pt. I at 161. 
129. See id. at 183-91. 
130. [d. at 183. 
131. [d. at 178-80. One estimate predicts an increase in the Pinelands of 141,300 households 
during the 1980's, and an increase of 83,500 in the 1990's. [d. at 179, Table 5.16. 
132. National Parks & Recreation Act of 1978, § 502, 16 U.S.C. § 471i (Supp .. III 1979); 
Pinelands Protection Act, N.J. REV. STAT. SS 13:18A-1 to 13:18A-29 (Supp. 1980). 
133. N.J. REV. STAT. S 13:18A-9 (Supp. 1980). 
134. [d. 
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horticultural uses; the discouragement of piecemeal and scattered 
development; and the encouragement of appropriate patterns of 
compatible residential, commercial, and industrial development, in 
or adjacent to areas already utilized for such purposes, to accom-
modate regional growth influences in an orderly way while protect-
ing the Pinelands environment from the cumulative adverse impacts 
thereof.135 These goals in essence were formally adopted by the 
Pinelands Commission.136 
The basic premise behind establishing the Pinelands as a National 
Reserve was that the government could not achieve its desired goals 
by the outright purchase of the entire area.137 The area was too vast, 
the development pressures were legitimate and intense, and the 
history of the Pinelands was grounded in private land ownership. 
However, despite these factors, the Commission enacted a system of 
land acquisition138 as one of its many programs for the area. 139 The 
Commission selected as potential areas for acquisition those parcels 
of land "meriting the greater level of protection implicit in public 
ownership because of their ecological, historical, recreational, or 
other value to the public."140 The acquisition may be in fee simple or 
involve only a partial acquisition of interest,14l whichever is required 
to further the goals of the state. The initial evaluation by the Com-
mission identified more than 65,000 acres as potential areas of ac-
quisition.142 
135. ld. 
136. The actual goals and policies as adopted by the Commission and reproduced in the CMP 
are much more detailed. However, the underlying ideas are identical. See CMP, supra note 2, 
pt. I at 193-94. 
137. DRAFT Summary, supra note 18, at 4-5. 
138. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 213-17. 
139. Other management programs are: Surface and Groundwater Resources Program; 
Vegetation and Wildlife Program; Wetlands Program; Fire Management Program; Forestry 
Program; Air Quality Program; Cultural Resources Program; Natural Scenic Resources Pro-
gram; Agricultural Program; Waste Management Program; Resource Extraction Program; 
Data Management Program; and Pinelands Development Credit Program. All but the last are 
outside the scope of this article. See generally id. 
140. ld. at 213. The Commission does not have the authority to actually purchase the land 
itself. Rather, the Commission makes recommendations to the Dep't of Environmental Protec-
tion which, in turn, enters into the formal agreements to purchase. ld. at 214. 
141. Such partial acquisition would likely be in the form of a "conservation easement." A 
conservation easement is the acquisition by the government of the owner's right to develop the 
land, leaving the owner with all other rights of ownership, including the right of continued 
possession. Its purpose is to conserve environmental amenities of land, air, soil, open space, 
and historic areas. The easement runs with the land and binds all subsequent purchasers. 
Rose, A Proposal/or the Separation a/Marketability a/Development Rights as a Technique to 
Preserve Open Space, 2 REAL ESTATE L.J. 635, 640 (1974). 
142. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 217. 
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The thousands of acres not recommended for public acquisition 
also needed to be regulated in a manner consistent with the 
aforementioned goals of the Plan.143 Of necessity, the level and type 
of regulation had to vary according to the particular characteristics 
of the land. Therefore, the Commission divided the Pinelands 
Reserve into several land use planning areas,144 each environmental~ 
ly distinguishable and requiring individual regulatory treatment.145 
The Preservation Area District contains 334,000 acres146 and rep-
resents what is readily identifiable as the "essence of the 
Pinelands."147 This district contains "the most critical ecological 
values in the region and is the least populated."148 The land uses 
deemed appropriate by the Commission for this district include berry 
agriculture, horticulture of native plants, other compatible agricul-
tural activities, forestry, low intensity and selective intensive recrea-
tional uses, limited resource extraction, and public service infra-
structure to serve the needs of the district.149 
Housing opportunities in the Preservation Area District are 
limited to those persons owning at least 3.2 acres of land150 who can 
demonstrate a cultural, social, or economic link to the essential 
character of the Pinelands. The parcel of land must have been owned 
by the applicant before the implementation of the Pinelands Plan in 
February, 1979. In addition, either the applicant's family must have 
resided in the Pinelands for at least 20 years prior to February, 1979, 
or his primary source of income must be a "resource-related" activi-
ty. Furthermore, the Plan requires that the applicant may not have 
built a dwelling within the previous five years and that the dwelling 
sought must be the applicant's principle place of residence.151 This 
143. See supra text at notes 134-36. 
144. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 195. 
145. The land use planning area classification should not be confused with the original 
statutory Preservation Area-Protection Area delineation. Both the Preservation and Protec-
tion Areas contain several smaller land use planning areas. The Preservation Area contains 
the Preservation Area District, Special Agricultural Production Areas, and a portion of the 
Agricultural Production Areas. The Protection Area includes the Forest Area, the Regional 
Growth Areas, and most of the Agricultural Production Areas. [d. at 195-96. 
146. An area of 176,000 acres is state-owned land and was so before the Plan was for-
mulated. [d. at 201. 
147. [d. 
148. [d. 
149. [d. at 201; id., pt. II, § 5-302. Municipalities are authorized to designate Special 
Agricultural Production Areas to be devoted exclusively to berry agricultural and native horti-
cultural uses, other environmentally compatible agricultural activities, and related agricul-
tural housing. [d., pt. I at 195; pt. II, § 5-305. 
150. The lot must be at least 3.2 acres to meet the Plan's water quality standards dealing 
with nitrate contamination from septic systems. DRAFT Summary, supra note 18, at 7. 
151. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 202; pt. II, § 5-302(A). 
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narrowly-drafted "Piney" exception, as it is called, is a manifesta-
tion of the Commission's conclusion that the people of the Pinelands 
constitute one of the area's most important cultural resources. As 
such, the essential character of their lifestyle must be maintained.152 
The Commission classified those lands outside the Preservation 
Area District which also possess the "essential character" of the 
Pinelands as Forest Areas. 153 These largely undisturbed forest and 
coastal wetland areas adjoining the Preservation Area and extend-
ing southward contain some 420,000 acres.154 The same land uses 
permitted in the Preservation Area District are allowed in Forest 
Areas. In addition, municipalities, at their option, may allow certain 
other uses, such as commercial establishments, industries related to 
Pinelands resources, and extraction of sand, gravel, or minerals. 155 
The Forest Areas have little residential development as human in-
fluences have been minima1.156 The Pinelands Plan calls for assign-
ing each municipality within the Forest Area a specified number of 
housing units which may be built, the number equalling one dwelling 
unit for each 15.8 acres of privately held, undeveloped land within 
the municipality.157 These houses must be built on lots of no less than 
3.2 acres. 15S Independent of this specified residential development, 
the "Piney" exception, as in the Preservation Area District, pro-
vides additional housing for residents who can show the requisite 
cultural or economic ties to the land.159 Furthermore, each 
municipality with jurisdiction ov~r land in the Forest Area must pro-
vide for the clustering of residential development rights away from 
any parcel of land located in the municipality's Forest Area to other 
areas in the municipality. 160 These cluster areas must contain at least 
152. Id., pt. I at 237. This "Piney" exception is presently being challenged on equal protec-
tion grounds in the New Jersey courts. Township of Folsom v. N. J., No. A-1675-80-T1 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div., filed Jan. 7, 1981). 
153. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 195. 
154. DRAFT Summary, supra note 18, at 10. About one fourth of this area is already in 
public ownership as state forests, parks, and wildlife management areas. About one third, 
while within the National Reserve along the coast, is outside the state's Pinelands jurisdiction. 
Id. 
155. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 202. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. DRAFT Summary, supra note 18, at 10. 
159. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 202; see infra text and notes at notes 150-51 for the full re-
quirements. Two other situations may arise where the persons involved are exempt from 
development limitations: (1) when the owner of a one-acre or larger lot owned the land prior to 
Feb., 1979, he is entitled to a one-year exemption (municipalities have the option to extend the 
period); (2) when the developer had obtained final local approval for the project prior to Feb., 
1979. These exemptions also apply in the Agricultural Production and Rural Development 
Areas. DRAFT Summary, supra note 18, at 14-15. 
160. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 203; pt. II, § 5-130. 
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500 acres capable of handling development with minimal en-
vironmental damage.161 
A third designated land use planning area encompasses "Ib ]locs of 
more than 1,000 acres of active farmland and adjacent farm soil."162 
Such land has been designated under the Plan as Agricultural Pro-
duction Areas where farming and related activities will remain the 
dominant land use.163 About 79,600 acres fall into this category, all 
but 2,000 acres of which lie in the Protection Area.164 Single family 
residential development is allowed in this area at a density of one 
unit per ten acres, as long as the house is part of a farm and is in-
tended for the use of the farm's owner or employees.166 In addition, 
any person able to show a link to the social and economic character of 
the Pinelands, thereby qualifying under the "Piney" exception, is 
permitted to build in these areas.166 
Some 145,000 acres of land, spread throughout all seven counties, 
are in a transitional period-somewhat fragmented by existing 
development, but with some highly viable agriculturalland.167 These 
lands are designated as Rural Development Areas. Under the Plan, 
the municipalities retain discretion as to land use and residential 
dwelling density in these areas, provided that the land uses are com-
patible with the essential character of the Pinelands. Furthermore, 
the total number of new units may not exceed 200 per square mile of 
private, nonwetland, undeveloped land.16s These areas are to serve 
as "municipal growth reserves"169 for future community develop-
ment as needed. 
A key element of the Pinelands Plan is the direction of present 
community development into those areas "where the capability to 
absorb development is high and the pressure to develop is great"170 
-designated Regional Growth Areas. The Plan stipulates overall 
densities, ranging from one to three and one-half units per acre of 
developable land, at which municipalities will allow new development 
in their Growth Areas.171 In Atlantic City, for example, where the 
greatest level of development is expected, the Plan allows for the 
161. [d., pt. I at 203. 
162. DRAFT Summary, supra note 18, at 10. 
163. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 203; DRAFT Summary, supra note 18, at 10. 
164. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 203. 
165. [d., pt. I at 203; pt. II, S 5-304(A)(2). 
166. [d., pt. I at 203; pt. II, S 5-304(A)(1). 
167. [d., pt. I at 203. 
168. [d., pt. I at 205; pt. II, S 5-306(A). This figures out to one dwelling unit per 3.2 acres. 
169. [d., pt. I at 205. 
170. [d. 
171. [d., pt. II, S 5-308(A). 
1982] NEW JERSEY PINELANDS 201 
construction of 45,300 housing units to be accompanied within 
28,600 acres designated as Growth Areas, for an average of 1.6 units 
per acre.172 Any other land uses are permitted in the Growth Area at 
a municipality's option, provided that the Plan's environmental 
standards are met.173 The Regional Growth Areas encompass 
119,050 acres, with approximately half considered developable. At 
the overall base densities specified in the Plan, 141,350 new units 
could be built in these areas. 174 
One likely consequence of channeling development into the Growth 
Areas is that there will be an upward shift in land values in those 
areas. 175 At the same time, the limited residential development in en-
vironmentally sensitive parts of the Pinelands restricts the land-
owner's chance to d€velop and increase the value of his land.176 In an 
effort to share the burden and the profits, as well as to further the 
overall Pinelands protection effort, the Commission instituted an in-
novative program known as the Pinelands Development Credits.177 
As this program is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the 
overall Pinelands Plan, close examination of transferable develop-
ment rights and the Pinelands Development Credit Program is re-
quired. 
III. TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 
A. TDR's Generally 
1. The TDR Concept 
A development right is essentially a creature of property law. It is 
one of the bundle of rights included in the fee simple ownership of 
real estate.178 The basic concept of transfer of development rights is 
the severance of the right to develop from the bundle of rights im-
plicit in land ownership and the conveyance of that development 
right to the owner of a nearby, or even a distant, tract of land.179 The 
172. DRAFT Summary, supra note 18, at 11. 
173. [d. 
174. DRAFT Summary, supra note 18, at 11-12. 
175. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 210. See also G. Christian, J. Nicholas & J. Towles, 
Economic Analysis of Pinelands Comprehensive Management Plan 11 (Nov. 20, 1980) 
[hereinafter cited as Economic Analysis]. 
176. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 210. See generally Economic Analysis, supra note 175, at 
11-14. 
177. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 210-12; pt. II, SS 5-401 to 5-407. 
178. See Chavooshian, Norman & Niesland, Transfer of Development Rights: New Ccmcept 
in Land Use Management, in THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS: A NEW TECHNIQUE OF 
LAND USE REGULATION 171 (J. Rose ed. 1975). 
179. 3 Ross, HARDIES, O'KEEFE, BABCOCK & PARSONS, SUBSTANTIVE ELEMENTS, PRO-
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transferor's title thereby incurs a permanent prohibition against 
development, although the remainder of his bundle of rights remains 
intact. 180 
The idea of severing property rights is not foreign. The separation 
and alienability of such components of title as mineral rights and 
mortgage liens has long been accepted. 181 This idea is thus being ap-
plied to that right which permits an owner to build upon or develop 
his land.182 For years TDR systems have been widely acclaimed as a 
method of preserving landmarks or open spaces while imposing 
neither a hardship on the landowners, nor the expense of acquisition 
on the municipality. 183 Yet, extension of the severance concept to 
development rights has been a long time coming. Undoubtedly, the 
uncertain legal status of the TDR technique has been a major cause 
of this delay. 184 
The development rights transfer technique requires that a master 
plan identify two areas, or districts: "one from which rights may be 
transferred and a second to which rights may be transferred."185 As 
to the latter, the plan must also specify the development density186 at 
which the average landowner can build, as well as the higher 
development density allowed with the purchase of development 
credits. Then the method for assigning and allocating the develop-
ment "rights" or "credits" must be determined. The four principal 
methods of allocation that have been suggested are acreage, fair 
market value, assessed value, and development potential.187 Fair 
market value and development potential are the more complex 
methods, as they are less easily ascertainable and highly 
speculative;188 the simpler method of raw acreage, or some deriva-
tion thereof, seems to be the most popular .189 
CEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE LAND MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES OF POTENTIAL RELEVANCE FOR 
THE NEW JERSEY PINELANDS: A REPORT TO THE PINELANDS COMMISSION 85 (1980) [hereinafter 
cited as Ross REPORT]. 
180. Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, 84 YALE: L.J. 1101, 
1101-02 (1975). 
181. THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS: A NEW TECHNIQUE OF LAND USE REGULATION 
3 (J. Rose ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Rose]. 
182. Chavooshian, supra note 178, at 171. 
183. Note, supra note 180, at 1101. 
184. Ross REPORT, supra note 179, at 95-96. 
185. [d. at 86. 
186. This term simply refers to the number of dwelling units per acre. 
187. Ross REPORT, supra note 179, at 86. For a discussion of methods of allocation, see Car-
michael, Transferable Development Rights: Legal Precedents for Adoption of a TDR System: 
Colorado, 304 PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE 30 (1975); Heeter, Transferable Development 
Rights: Six Basic Requirements for a TDR System, 304 PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE 43 
(1975). 
188. Ross REPORT, supra note 179, at 86. 
189. J. WYNN, ApPENDIX B, THE TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS: A PRELIMINARY 
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Once the allocation method has been determined, the development 
rights must be assigned and certified to the landowners in the 
transferor district.190 Those certified development credits may then 
be sold on the open market to a landowner in the specified district 
who desires to develop his land to a greater density or intensity of 
use than that allowed by the applicable zoning ordinance.191 Roughly 
speaking, the market price should be equal to what it would cost the 
transferee owner to purchase an adjacent tract of land that would 
enlarge the size of the transferee owner's land sufficiently to permit 
the proposed development.192 However, if the governing body does 
not want to allow potentially unstable market forces to control the 
ultimate price, a development rights bank may be established. This 
bank would purchase the rights directly from the transferor district 
landowners at a stable rate and resell the rights as credits to 
transferee district landowners.193 A third option would be to allow 
the holder of the development rights to sell them on the open market 
if desired and possible; the bank would be ready to step in as a pur-
chaser if the holder so desired or in hardship cases as a last resort.194 
2. Application of the Concept 
As mentioned above,195 application of the transferable develop-
ment right concept has been limited to date. TDR's have been used 
to an extent in some major urban areas to preserve historic land-
marks. For example, .New York- City utilized TDR's in connection 
with its landmark preservation program enacted in 1965.196 Under 
this system, buildiugs designated as landmarks could not be 
destroyed or altered, thereby resulting in substantial underdevelop-
REVIEW OF TWELVE PROGRAMS, in COALITION FOR THE SENSIBLE PRESERVATION OF THE 
PINELANDS: REPORT TO THE PINELANDS COMMISSION ON THE PRESERVATION AREA 9 (1980) 
[hereinafter cited as WYNN REPORT]. 
190. Ross REPORT, supra note 179, at 86. 
191. Id. at 87. The purchase of TDR's might constitute a "waiver" of the local zoning limita· 
tions. More likely, however, the zoning ordinance would provide a range of development 
restrictions. Each owner could develop his land to the degree located at the lower end of the 
range; whereas, those who purchase TDR's could look to the higher end of the range as their 
limit. See infra text and notes at notes 232·37. 
192. Ross REPORT, supra note 179, at 87. 
193. Note, supra note 180, at 1102; Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Ex· 
ploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75, 87 (1973). With either method of transfer, the transferor 
landowner who also owned land in the transferee district would have the option of transfering 
his development rights from the restricted parcel to the developable tract. 
194. J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT: SAVING URBAN LANDMARKS THROUGH THE CmCAGO PLAN 
52 (1974). 
195. See supra text and notes at notes 183·84. 
196. See J. COSTONIS, supra note 194, at 54·60. See also Marcus, The Grand Slam Grand 
Central Terminal Decision: A Euclidfor Landmarks, Favorable Noticefor TDR and A Resolu· 
tion of the Regulatory/Taking Impasse, 7 ECOL. L. Q. 731 (1978). 
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ment of the location sites.197 The New York City landmarks or-
dinance198 allowed the unused development potential of sites occu-
pied by landmark structures to be sold and transferred to adjacent 
and nearby properties. The floor area of the transferee lot could then 
be increased by more than 20 percent over prevailing zoning 
ceilings. 199 Similar programs designed to encourage landmark 
preservation were attempted in San Francisco20o and Washington, 
D.C.201 
A well-documented program was also devised to encourage the 
preservation of landmark structures in Chicago.202 This proposed 
plan differed from the New York system in that development rights 
could be transferred anywhere in a transferee district encompassing 
most of Chicago's central business district.203 Also, a development 
rights bank was to be utilized as a transfer medium.204 Although the 
Chicago Plan stirred up much of the current interest in the TDR con-
cept,205 it was never adopted.206 
The other instances of experimentation with the TDR concept 
have involved attempts to preserve open space. One such attempt 
was in the Tudor Parks area of New York City.207 Private parks in 
this area were rezoned as public parks. Because of this, the parks' 
owners were granted the option to transfer their unusable above-
surface development rights to certain other property in midtown 
Manhattan.208 The property to which the TDR's were transferred 
197. Ross REPORT, supra note 179, at 88. 
198. Landmarks Preservation Law, NEW YORK CITY, N.Y. CHARTER AND ADMIN. CODE, ch. 
8-A, S§ 205-1.0 to 207-21.0 (1976). 
199. J. COSTONIS, supra note 194, at 54. Additionally, there were a "wide array of controls" 
over these transfers to insure compatibility of the resulting development with the surrounding 
area.Id. at 54-55. 
200. Id. at 54. 
201. ERVIN, J. FITCH, R. GODWIN, W. SHEPARD & H. STOEVENER, LAND USE CONTROL: 
EVALUATING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EFFECTS 132 (1979). 
202. See, e.g., J. COSTONIS, supra note 194; Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning 
and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972). 
203. Ross REPORT, supra note 179, at 88. 
204. J. COSTONIS, supra note 194, at 105-06. 
205. Ross REPORT, supra note 179, at 88. 
206. Exactly why this plan was never adopted is unclear. However, one commentator claims 
that the reason is simple: Chicago is a "developer's town;" the developers oppose the plan; 
therefore, the city administration will not take action to implement it. Newsom, Transferable 
De'lJelaprrumt Rights: Critique of the Chicago Plan, 304 PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE 9 (1975). 
207. This plan was successfully challenged by the affected landowners. See infra text and 
notes at notes 376-86; Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of N.Y., 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 
385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). 
208. Lots eligible to receive the TDR's were limited to those within the boundaries of 60th 
Street, Third Avenue, 38th Street, and Eighth Avenue. Furthermore, only those lots with a 
minimum lot size of 30,000 square feet and zoned to permit development at the maximum com-
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could then enjoy a 10 percent or more increase in floor area ratio 
density.209 This attempt to preserve open space, however, was un-
successful. 210 
At least twelve other TDR programs have been established by or-
dinance with the primary objective being the preservation of en-
vironmentally sensitive areas, open space, or agricultural lands.211 
These twelve programs are TDR programs only in its broadest 
sense, as they vary greatly.212 All are voluntary in that landowners 
have the option of developing their land in compliance with preexist-
ing zoning laws or with the zoning established in the TDR 
ordinance.213 Only one program could be classified as at all restric-
tive.214 More importantly, under these voluntary TDR programs, on-
ly a very small number of landowners have exercised their option to 
transfer development rights.216 Thus, it appears that the TDR pro-
grams to date have enjoyed only limited success and provide little in-
sight as to how TDR's can be most effectively utilized.216 The recent-
ly proposed Pinelands Plan, therefore, represents a dramatic and ex-
perimental change in the modern approach to the use of TDR's. 
B. The Pine lands Development Credit Program 
The Pinelands Development Credit (PDC) Program is the first ma-
jor attempt to implement TDR's in conjunction with a comprehen-
mercia! density were eligible. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of N.Y., 39 N.Y.2d 587,592,350 
N.E.2d 381, 384, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 8, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). 
209. Marcus, Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause: The Case of 
Manhattan's Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 77, 83 (1974-75). 
210. The plan was declared invalid by the New York Supreme Court in Fred F. French Inv. 
Co. v. City of N.Y., 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429 
U.S. 990 (1976). See discussion infra at Section IV(B)(2). 
211. WYNN REPORT, supra note 189, at 2. Air rights transfer programs and landmark 
preservation were excluded from the study. Those programs reviewed are located in Chester-
field and Hillsborough, New Jersey; Eden and Southhampton, New York; Windsor, Connecti-
cut: Birmingham, Buckingham, and Upper Makefield, Pennsylvania; Calvert County, 
Maryland; Collier County and St. Petersburg, Florida; Santa Monica-Malibu, California. [d. 
212. [d. 
213. [d. at 6. 
214. [d. The semirestrictive program is the Collier County Program. [d. 
215. [d. at 3-5. In all there have been only 89 transfers. The California Program accounted 
for 80 of the 89 transactions, four programs each had one transfer, and five programs report 
no transfers. [d. at 3-4. 
216. However, for more details as to the mechanics of the various programs, see WYNN 
REPORT, supra note 189, or Ross REPORT, supra note 179, at 89-96. 
In contrast, several ambitious TDR programs have been proposed as methods of land use 
management in Maryland, Virginia, and California; to preserve fragile ecological resources in 
Puerto Rico; and to preserve open space in New Jersey. For details, see Rose, supra note 181. 
These were never adopted by the appropriate governing bodies. 
Legislation authorizing the use of TDR techniques has been prepared and introduced in the 
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sive management plan.217 The New Jersey Legislature recom-
mended,218 and the Pinelands Commission agreed, that the PDC pro-
gram would be an equitable supplement to the regulatory elements 
of the Pinelands Plan. It would provide an alternative use to proper-
ty owners in the Preservation Area District, Special Agricultural 
Areas,219 and the Agricultural Production Areas.22o The develop-
ment credits allowed to landowners in these districts may be pur-
chased by landowners in Growth Areas to gain bonus development 
potential. Thus, the credits provide a mechanism by which the 
restricted landowner may participate in any increase in development 
values which are realized in the Growth Areas.221 
The development credits are allocated on the basis of both acreage 
and productivity of land. This system recognizes the higher value of 
farmland and so provides fewer credits to owners of nonproductive 
wetlands.222 In the Preservation Area District, landowners are en-
titled to 1.0 credit for each thirty-nine acres.223 Wetlands yield only 
0.2 credits for thirty-nine acres.224 In Agricultural Areas,225 all 
uplands and areas of active agriculture, including bogs and fields 
used for berry cultivation, are allocated 2.0 credits for thirty-nine 
acres.226 Wetlands which are not active agricultural bogs or fields 
collect the basic 0.2 credits for thirty-nine acres.227 
These Pinelands Development Credits (PDC's) can be sold on the 
open market, using a legal instrument similar to a conventional prop-
erty deed.228 The Commission recommends the establishment of a 
development rights bank which would provide loan guarantees and 
New Jersey Legislature with some regularity, but has never been passed. Ross REPORT, supra 
note 179, at 96. 
217. See generally CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 210-12. 
218. N.J. REV. STAT. § 13:18A-8(d)(1); see STATE ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT COMMITTEE 
STATEMENT, SENATE, No. 3091-L 1979, c. 111, reprinted in N.J. REV. STAT. § 13:18A-1 (Supp. 
1980) (portion deleted). 
219. See supra note 149. 
220. CMP, supra note 2, at pt. I at 210. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. Id; id., pt. II, § 5-403(B)(1)(a). Owners of less than the 39 acres receive the appropriate 
fraction thereof. 
224. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 210; pt. II, § 5-403(B)(1)(b). 
225. This includes both the Agricultural Production Areas and Special Agricultural Areas. 
226. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 210; pt. II, § 5-403(B)(2)(a). 
227. Id., pt. I at 210; pt. II, § 5-403(B)(2)(b). The program also provides that "owners of lots 
ranging in size between a tenth of an acre and 9.75 acres will be allocated at least one-fourth 
credit, provided that they owned the lot on February 7, 1979, that the property is vacant, and 
that it is not in common ownership with contiguous land." DRAFT Summary, supra note 18, 
at 13. 
228. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 210. When the landowner sells her credits, she is required 
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serve on a limited basis as a buyer for credits in hardship 
situations.229 To date, the appropriate enabling legislation to create 
such a bank has not been adopted by the New Jersey Legislature.23o 
When a PDC is transferred to a Regional Growth Area,231 the 
transferee landowner gains four bonus housing units.232 Local 
governments in the Growth Areas are required to adopt land use 
regulations which allow for the use of these credits. To encourage 
the even distribution of bonus housing units and the maintenance of 
consistent housing types in various neighborhoods, residential den-
sities must be presented in a range.233 The low density establishes 
the base density for a zone; by applying development credits to a 
parcel of land within that zone, development could take place at the 
higher end of the density range.234 The bonus housing capacity 
created by the zoning density ranges could increase the number of 
potential units allowed in the Growth Areas by about 50 percent, or 
approximately 70,000 units.235 However, the number of development 
credits allocated to landowners, and thus available for purchase, 
would generate the bonus housing potential for only about 30,000 
units.236 The overall ratio of potential housing capacity (70,000) to 
available bonus units (30,000) is about 2.3 to 1.0. It is this ratio of de-
mand to supply which is expected to provide the necessary market 
for the PDC'S.237 
There are two other aspects of the PDC program worth noting. 
First, the Commission acknowledges that the success of the program 
to record a deed establishing a restriction which limits the future use of her land to those 
allowed under the Plan for the area in which the land is located. Id. 
229. Id., pt. I at 212. See general discussion supra text and notes at notes 192-94. 
230. Telephone conversation with the Pinelands Commissioner (Oct. 9, 1981). Legislation to 
establish a development rights bank was proposed. However, it was attacked by opponents of 
the Pinelands Plan to an ill-fated bill which sought to "water down" the Plan. The "Perskie 
Amendment," if it had been passed, would have stripped the Pinelands Commission of its 
power in the Protection Area, making it advisory only, and deleted from the Pinelands Protec-
tion Act the specific goal of discouraging scattered and piecemeal development. Legislation to 
create a bank is expected to be proposed again in the next legislative session. 
231. See supra text and notes at notes 170-74. 
232. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 210. The fractions of credits allocated in certain situations 
can be aggregated from different transfers and used as a whole when the unit is assembled. Id. 
233. Id. The Plan sets these ranges as: less than 0.5 to 0.5 dwelling units per acre; 0.5 to 1 
unit per acre; 1 to 2 units per acre; 2 to 3 units per acre; 3 to 4 units per acre; 4 to 6 units per 
acre; 6 to 9 units per acre; 9 to 12 units per acre; and 12 or more dwelling units per acre. See 
id., pt. I at 211, Table 7.4. 
234. Id., pt. I at 210. 
235. Id., pt. I at 212. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. If and when development conditions and housing demands warrant, Municipal 
Reserve Areas are ready to act as "safety valves" to provide the additional capacity to utilize 
·bonus units. See supra text and notes at notes 165-67. 
208 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:183 
depends on the ability of developers to utilize their bonus units 
without any additional delays or review requirements which might 
add incremental costs to the development project and discourage 
transfers. Therefore, the program requires municipalities to enact 
zoning ordinances which provide clear standards for the expeditious 
utilization of the credits.238 Second, the Plan requires that public in-
formation about the PDC program be thoroughly distributed to all 
those persons who might have an interest in the program. The Com-
mission believes that a clear understanding of the Plan is essential to 
its proper implementation and to the creation of a viable private 
market for PDC'S.239 
The validity of the transferable development right concept is as yet 
unascertained. In virtually every instance in which the concept has 
been put into effect, "the system has been accompanied by either 
threatened or actual litigation, some of which has been settled and 
some of which has been disposed of at the trial court level without a 
reported decision."24o The controversy over TDR's centers on 
whether or not the use of such systems results in an unconstitutional 
"taking." In the two reported decisions dealing with TDR's,241 the 
courts were less than definitive as to the answer. Some commen-
tators interpret these cases as being wholly negative reviews of the 
TDR concept;242 others view the "score" as being "one to one."243 In 
order to understand this limited judicial evaluation of TDR's as a 
regulatory tool,244 however, the cases must be viewed in light of the 
historic controversy between noncompensable regulation and un-
constitutional "takings." 
IV. THE "TAKING" ISSUE: LAND USE PLANNING & TDR's 
The issue of what constitutes an unconstitutional "taking" has 
been much debated in the courts.245 The root of the controversy ap-
pears to be a basic judicial inability to define the contours of two 
238. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 210. 
239. [d., pt. I at 212. 
240. Ross REPORT, supra note 179, at 96. To date, there is no pending litigation actually 
challenging the validity of the PDC program, although suits have been brought challenging 
other provisions of the Plan. See supra notes 22 and 152. 
241. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, rehearing denied, 439 U.S. 883 
(1978) (upheld New York City Historic Landmark Preservation Program); Fred F. French Inv. 
Co. v. City of N.Y., 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal di..'lmissed, 429 
U.S. 990 (1976) (invalidated program to preserve open space). 
242. E.g., Note, supra note 180, at 1107. 
243. Ross REPORT, supra note 179, at 96; Marcus, supra note 196, at 731-32. 
244. The TDR cases will be discussed fully infra at Section IV(B)(2). 
245. See cases cited infra throughout this section. 
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separate concepts: eminent domain and the police power. Eminent 
domain is derived from the fifth amendment of the federal Constitu-
tion246 and similar state provisions. The use of eminent domain is 
limited to "taking" for a public purpose and must be accompanied by 
the giving of just compensation to the owners of the property 
"taken."247 The police power, on the other hand, is the authority con-
ferred upon the states by the tenth amendment of the federal Con-
stitution248 to regulate in furtherance of the public order, safety, 
health, morals, and the general welfare. This power is subject to 
limitations imposed by federal and state constitutions and particular-
ly by the requirement of due process.249 The literal interpretation of 
this due process safeguard would not suggest that its abuse would 
lead to a "taking." However, this was exactly the conclusion reached 
by the Supreme Court in 1922, as Justice Holmes declared: "while 
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too 
far it will be recognized as a taking."25o 
Therefore, it is the Court's view that property can be "taken" in 
two ways: the state may "take" property by eminent domain 
because it is useful to the public; or it may "take" property under the 
police power to avoid harm to the general welfare.251 Although some 
might consider this an insignificant question of semantics, there re-
mains a major distinction between the due process and fifth amend-
ment "taking" checks on government action. When property has 
been "taken" by eminent domain, just compensation is due the 
owner. 252 To the contrary, when oppressive regulation under the 
police power is determined to be tantamount to a "taking," the 
remedy is invalidation of the regulation itself.253 As long as this 
remedial distinction remains, the particular characterization of any 
"taking" by a court could have serious financial ramifications for the 
responsible government entity. 254 
246. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
247. The fifth amendment states in relevant part: "nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4. 
248. The tenth amendment reads in full that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
249. The relevant part of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution 
states that "[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of ... property, without due process of 
law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
250. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
251. E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 546 (1905). 
252. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36 (1964). 
253. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
254. In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981), five 
members of the Court (one of whom was the recently retired Justice Stewart) agreed in a 
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The leading case dealing with the issue of "taking" is Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (Penn. Coal}.266 There the claimant coal 
company sold the surface rights to certain parcels of land to the 
Mahons, expressly reserving the right to remove all the coal 
thereunder. After the transactions, however, Pennsylvania enacted 
a statute known as the Kohler Act which prohibited the mining of an-
thracite coal in such a way as to cause the subsidence of any house 
unless the house was owned by the owner of the underlying coal and 
was 150 feet from the improved property of another. 256 The effect of 
this regulation was to make it "commercially impracticable"257 to 
mine the coal, thereby destroying the property rights intentionally 
retained by the claimant. 268 Thus, when the Mahons brought suit to 
enjoin the coal company from mining under their house, as pre-
scribed by the Kohler Act, the company countered with the claim 
that the Act was unconstitutional. Specifically, the company argued 
that the Act was not a police power regulation at all, but, rather, 
amounted to a public taking of private property without the requisite 
just compensation.269 
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, admitted that "'[g]overn-
ment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property 
could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the 
general law."26o However, regulations properly issued pursuant to 
separate dissent and concurrence that it was time that the Court recognize that just compensa-
tion is the proper remedy for all "takings." Therefore, where government regulatory action is 
determined to constitute a "taking," the Constitution requires that the government entity pay 
"just compensation for the period commencing on the date the regulation first effected the 
'taking,' and ending on the date the government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend 
the regulation." Id. at 653. 
The State of New Jersey, as amicus curiae expressed its concern that such a decision by the 
Court would undermine further land use planning. 
A reversal by the Court could impose serious financial burdens on small 
municipalities and even greater impacts at the State and regional levels. Govern-
ment officials charged with planning and regulatory responsibilities for en-
vironmentally important areas would fear potential liability in those many situa-
tions where the public interest collides with development pressures. Government 
agencies could suffer severe financial hardship even though officials acted in 
good faith and in accordance with the best available technical and legal advice. 
The State's land use planning efforts would be rendered nugatory in sueh cir-
cumstances. 
Amicus Curiae Brief for the State of New Jersey at 9-10, San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City 
of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981). 
255. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
256. Id. at 412-13. 
257. Id. at 414. 
258. Id. 
259. See id. at 396-404. 
260. Id. at 413. 
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the police power, such as the Kohler Act, could go "too far ... [and 
would] be recognized as a taking,"261 rendering the regulation in-
valid.262 The difference between permissible regulation and a "tak-
ing" was one of degree, to be determined by an examination of the 
particular facts. 263 In this case, the degree of regulation was too 
great to be sustained.264 
Justice Brandeis, in dissent, viewed police power regulation and 
public "taking" as different in kind, not in degree as Holmes had 
written. He felt that a restriction "imposed to protect the public 
health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a taking."265 
Therefore, Brandeis concluded, the restriction on coal mining under 
or near residences was merely "the prohibition of a noxious use" to 
protect the public and so was valid despite the degree of incidental 
burden placed on individual property owners.266 
The Penn. Coal case remains a strong influence on modern "tak-
ing" analysis. As prescribed by Holmes, the courts have looked to 
the particular circumstances of each "taking" challenge and have 
made their decisions on a case-by-case basis.267 Approaching the 
"taking" issue in this ad hoc fashion, the Supreme Court, by its own 
admission, has been unable to "develop any 'set formula' for deter-
mining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries 
caused by public action be compensated by the government."268 Yet, 
upon review of the myriad of "taking" challenges which have 
reached the courts, particularly in recent years,269 two general 
themes appear to run through the courts' analysis-themes which 
were at the heart of the Holmes' and Brandeis' opinions in Penn. 
Coal. Courts, when attempting to discern whether government ac-
tion is an unconstitutional "taking," look to: (1) the character, or 
261. [d. at 415. 
262. Notice that the proper remedy for this "taking" via the police power was invalidation 
of the statute and not just compensation. [d. at 416. 
263. [d. at 413. 
264. [d. at 416. 
265. [d. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). One report claims that Holmes "rewrote the Con-
stitution;" in partial reliance on Justice Brandeis' dissent, the authors urge that the Court 
overrule the Penn. Coal case and hold that "a regulation of the use of land, if reasonably 
related to a valid public purpose, can never constitute a taking." F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & 
J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 238, 124-38, 238-55 (1973) [hereinafter cited as THE TAKING 
ISSUE]. 
266. 260 U.S. at 417-18 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
267. E.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, rehearing denied, 439 
U.S. 883 (1978); United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958). 
268. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124 (citations omitted). 
269. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 104; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 
255 (1980). 
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"kind,"270 of interference with individual property rights; and (2) the 
"degree"271 of interference. A closer examination of the application 
of this two-prong analysis is required. 
A. Character of Action-HDifference in Kind" 
The "difference in kind" between regulation under the police 
power and "taking" by eminent domain is that between acting to 
"protect the public from detriment and danger"272 and acting to 
"confer benefits upon property owners" in genera1.273 Extreme ex-
amples of this difference in kind are found in two early cases: 
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. ,274 andMuglerv. Kansas.275 InPumpelly, 
a dam built pursuant to a state statute caused water to flood the com-
plainant's land, inflicting irreparable damage and rendering the 
property valueless.276 This was held to be a "taking," because the 
permanent flooding caused by the physical invasion by water had 
produced a practical ouster of possession. 277 This type of state action 
was deemed to be more appropriate to eminent domain than to the 
police power, as the property had in effect been devoted to the public 
use in furtherance of improved river navigation. As such, compensa-
tion was required.278 The rule of Pumpelly has been strictly followed 
in cases where, in pursuit of public goals, real estate has been per-
manently and directly invaded by water, earth, sand, or other 
material or artificial structure effectively destroying or impairing its 
usefulness.279 
270. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416-22 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). However, this is not 
the absolutist view-i.e. given a proper goal, regulation is always valid, despite the degree of 
interference-that the distinguished Justice, and some modern commentators, would prefer. 
See THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 265. 
271. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 393 (Holmes, J., majority). 
272. Id. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
273. Id. 
274. 80 U.S. 166 (1871). 
275. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
276. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 177. 
277. See Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 166 (1871), as discussed in Mugler v. Kan., 123 U.S. at 668. 
278. Government action such as this might be, and has often been, characterized in other 
terms-as the acquisition of an individual's resources "to permit or facilitate uniquely public 
functions." Penn Central Tramp. Co., 438 U.S. at 128. Examples of "takings" involving 
public function include: United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (direct overflights above 
claimant's chicken farm deemed a "taking" of an easement); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 
U.S. 84 (1962) (direct overflights determined to constitute "taking"); Portsmouth Harbor 
Land and Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) (United States military installation's 
repeated firing of guns over claimant's land deemed a "taking"); United States v. Cress, 243 
U.S. 316 (1917) (repeated floodings of land caused by water project tantamount to a "taking"). 
279. THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 265, at 115; see, e.g., United States v. Lynch, 188 U.S. 
445 (1903) ("taking" occurred when land turned into a bog); Bedford v. United States, 192 
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In Mugler v. Kansas, 280 a state law prohibiting the manufacture or 
sale of alcohol rendered complainant's brewery relatively worth-
less.281 Unlike Pumpelly, however, the regulation in this case was 
held to be a valid exercise of the police power.282 In Mugler, there 
had been no direct encroachment of property, but merely a prohibi-
tion of a use declared by legislation to be a nuisance detrimental to 
the health, morals, and safety of the community.283 The Court stated 
that such a prohibition of a noxious use would not be deemed "a tak-
ing or an appropriation of property for the public benefit."284 
Therefore, in contrast to physical invasion cases which are viewed as 
actionable under the principles of the eminent domain power, 
challenged regulations designed to abate nuisances are generally 
upheld as a valid exercise of the police power. 285 
"Taking" challenges which do not fall into the "physical invasion" 
or "nuisance" categories discussed above are the more difficult cases 
for the courts to decide. In such cases, the court must examine the 
facts to determine whether the interference with individual property 
rights is of the kind properly derived from the police power. For the 
interference to be of the proper kind, thereby justifying the state's 
imposition of its authority in behalf of the public, it "must appear, 
first, that the interests of the public generally . . . require such in-
terference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for 
the accomplishment of the purpose. "286 
1. In the Public Interest 
Traditionally, the police power has been used to protect the health, 
safety, and morals of the community in such forms as fire regula-
tions, garbage disposal control, quarantines, and restrictions upon 
U.S. 217 (1904) (land flooded by diversion of the Mississippi River deemed "taking"); Kaiser 
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (the federal government required a private marina 
to be opened to the public-just compensation required for the easement "taken"). 
280. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
281. [d. at 657. 
282. [d. at 675. 
283. [d. at 668-69. 
284. [d. 
285. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, Chief of Police of the City of Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 
394 (1915) (ordinance prohibiting the establishment or operation of a brickyard upheld as 
valid); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (ordinance regulating dredging 
and pit excavation on property upheld as valid). 
286. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 
590, 594-95 (1962). A third requirement is that the interference be "not unduly oppressive 
upon individuals." Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. at 137. However, this portion of the test has 
gained prominence and so will be discussed separately infra at Section IV(B). 
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liquor and prostitution.287 However, the scope of goals properly 
achievable through the use of police power regulation has been 
widening for many decades.288 As early as 1926, in Euclid v. 
Ambler,289 the Supreme Court recognized that the state's police 
power would necessarily have to expand to deal with the eomplexi-
ties and problems of the modern world. The high Court stated: 
[U]ntil recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but 
with the great increase and concentration of population, prob-
lems have developed, and constantly are developing, which re-
quire, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in 
respect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban com-
munities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of 
which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that 
they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a 
century ago, perhaps would have been rejected as arbitrary and 
oppressive. 290 
In recognition of the need to widen the state's police power, the 
Euclid Court held that a person who asserts the unconstitutionality 
of a land use regulation has the burden of demonstrating that the 
provisions are "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general 
welfare."291 Furthermore, there is a presumption in favor of validity 
-if the legitimacy of the zoning legislation is fairly debatable, the 
court must allow legislative judgment to contro1.292 
Despite the strong language used in Euclid favoring the broad-
ened use of police powers, the presumption in favor of the valid use 
of police power is not irrebuttable. Two years after Euclid, in Nectow 
v. City oj Cambridge, 293 a zoning ordinance similar to that upheld in 
Euclid294 was declared invalid to the extent that it applied to plain-
tiff's property.295 The ordinance divided the city into three districts 
-residential, business, and unrestricted-with plaintiff's land falling 
287. Sax, supra note 252, at 36, n.6. 
288. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Berman v. Parker, 348 
U.S. 26 (1954). 
289. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
290. [d. at 386-87. 
291. [d. at 395. 
292. [d. at 388. The Court never reached the "taking" issue in Euclid, saying only that 
there would be time enough to deal with the actual application of particular premises as cases 
arise. THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 262, at 137; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 262 
U.S. 365, 395-97 (1926). 
293. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
294. [d. at 185. 
295. [d. at 188-89. 
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within the residential zone.296 The Court held that there was no clear 
community interest in classifying plaintiff's land as residential, and 
so the action of the zoning authorities came within the ban of the 
fourteenth amendment.297 Therefore, the presence of a particular 
community interest, or the lack thereof, turns on the facts of each in-
dividual case. 
Similarly, several courts have held in past decades that zoning or-
dinances enacted to preserve land in its natural state have exceeded 
the limits of the police power.298 These "greenbelt"299 zoning laws 
were held to be "takings" because the courts viewed them as a 
means of acquiring lands for the public benefit rather than as regula-
tions to protect the public interest. By enforcing these ordinances, 
the government would itself be enriched at the expense of private 
landowners. Such an unjust result violates the guarantee of the fifth 
amendment and, therefore, cannot be accomplished by use of the 
police power. 
While the police power has been broadening in scope since the 
1920's, there has recently been a dramatic increase in the number of 
goals now accepted as necessary for the protection of the public in-
terest. "New and sophisticated public purposes"300 upheld by the 
courts have broadened the scope of the police power during a period 
of transition which some commentators term "the quiet revolution in 
land use control. "301 During this time period, the courts recognized 
as valid, for the first time, such government goals as the preserva-
tion of water quality,3.02 the preservation of exhaustible resources,303 
the preservation of open space,304 the preservation of the en-
296. [d. at 185. Under such zoning, only dwellings, hotels, clubs, churches, schools, philan· 
thropic institutions, greenhouses, and gardening were allowed in the residential zone. [d. 
297. [d. at 188·89. Cf Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (Court held that the communi· 
ty's interest in protecting its apple industry warranted the destruction, without compensation, 
of nearby diseased red cedar trees pursuant to a local ordinance). 
298. Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany·Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 
539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963); Nat'l Land and Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); 
see also MacGibbon v. Bd. of Appeals of Duxbury, 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970). 
299. A "greenbelt" is a belt of parkways, parks, or farmland which encircles a town or com· 
munity and is designed to prevent undesirable encroachment. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY 996 (1976). 
300. THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 265, at 260. 
301. F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971) 
[hereinafter QUIET REVOLUTION]. 
302. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); N.J. Builders Ass'n v. 
Dep't of Env. Protection, 169 N.J. Super. 76, 404 A.2d 320 (App. Div. 1979). 
303. Potomac Sand & Gravel Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241, cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972). 
304. Assoc'd Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Ca1.3d 
633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971). 
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vironmental character of a region,305 and the discouragement of 
premature and unnecessary conversion of open-space land to urban 
uses.306 The judicial view of such goals is no longer that these are 
governmental attempts to produce a public benefit and, therefore, 
more appropriate to eminent domain. Rather, courts view such 
regulation as aimed at preventing harm to the environmental status 
quO.307 Consequently, these environmental considerations are in-
creasingly recognized as a proper "kind" of interference with in-
dividual property rights and, as such, are valid goals achievable by 
use of the police power. 308 
2. Reasonableness of Means 
Once a court determines that a valid government goal is being pur-
sued, it must then consider whether the means chosen to achieve the 
desired goal are reasonable and nonarbitrary. 309 If the court finds 
that the means are unreasonable or arbitrary the state will be 
deemed to have exceeded the scope of its police power, despite the 
presence of a valid goal, and the regulation will be invalidated.310 As 
discussed above,311 however, there is a presumption favoring the 
validity of every regulation312-a presumption which the claimant in 
a "taking" challenge has the difficult burden of rebutting,,313 
305. Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 11 
Cal. App.3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970); Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of San· 
bornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972); Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7,201 N.W.2d 761 
(1972); Turnpike Realty v. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); In the Matter of Spring Valley Dev., 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973); 
People ex rei. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5 Cal.3d 480, 487 P.2d 1193, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553 
(1971). 
306. Agins v. City of TIburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); see also Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town 
of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972) (allowed "phased 
growth" plan geared to limitations of existing physical and financial resources to provide 
essential services). 
307. The court in Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7,16,201 N.W.2d 761, 767-68 (1972), 
expressly made this distinction. 
308. If it is determined that the goal sought to be achieved is improper under the police 
power, but, rather, is more appropriate under eminent domain, two remedies are available. 
Most often, if the effect on the regulated property is reversible by invalidating the regulation, 
the regulation will be struck down. If, however, the damage is irreversible and the owner will 
remain under a substantial hardship (as is often true with physical invasion cases, such as 
Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 166) just compensation will be awarded as required by the fifth amend-
ment. 
309. This is the second requirement that must be satisfied in order to justify the imposition 
of the state's authority on behalf of the public-the first requirement being that the goal pur-
sued must be in the public's interest. See supra text at note 286. 
310. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). 
311. See supra text at note 292. 
312. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
313. [d. 
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One relatively successful method of demonstrating the unreason-
ableness of means is to show that the regulation, despite serving a 
strong community interest, tends to further additional, improper 
goals. Whether this side-effect is intentional or not, it will render the 
regulation invalid.314 For example, in a series of cases, zoning 
regulations for population control and environmental protection 
were declared invalid because the land use restrictions produced an 
exclusionary effect-in particular, low- and moderate- income fam-
ilies were effectively and unlawfully excluded from the municipal-
ities involved.316 Although some regulations might be held valid 
despite such an exclusionary impact,316 when the adverse conse-
quences become "too predominant" the zoning provision cannot 
stand despite the fact that it bears some relationship to legitimate 
zoning purposes.317 Thus, while courts may highly commend zoning 
as a "means by which a governmental body can plan for the future," 
they will not sanction their use as a "means to deny the future."318 
Courts tend to presume that regulations which are part of a com-
prehensive plan are reasonable, and, therefore, judicial deference is 
shown.319 Such deference does not extend to review of local zoning 
regulation of selected parcels on a piecemeal basis because, in the lat-
ter situation, the element of collective judgment which a comprehen-
sive plan contains is lacking.320 Thus, although there were significant 
victories for local government zoning plans in the early 1970's,321 
some courts expressed hesitation in light of the absence of a plan for 
314. Although a court will generally treat the exclusionary aspects of legislation as an im-
permissible side-effect, it is more likely that the court suspects, but perhaps cannot prove, that 
exclusion was the primary motivation behind the legislation. As such, it cannot stand. 
315. Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481, 371 A.2d 1192 (1977); 
S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal 
dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Nat'l Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504,215 A.2d 597 
(1965); Kavanewsky v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 160 Conn. 397, 279 A.2d 567 (1971). 
316. E.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Wincamp Partnership, OTC v. 
Anne Arundel County, 458 F. Supp. 1009 (D.Md. 1978). 
317. Home Builders League of S. Jersey, Inc. v. Township of Berlin, 81 N.J. 127, 139, 405 
A.2d 381, 390 (1979). 
318. Nat'l Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 528, 215 A.2d 597, 610 (1965). 
319. Williamson, Constitutional and Judicial Limitations on the Community's Power to 
Downzone, 12 URB. LAW. 157, 181-82 (1980). See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 
132; Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 254 Md. 59, 254 A.2d 700 
(1969); McBee v. Baltimore County, 221 Md. 312, 157 A.2d 258 (1960). 
320. Williamson, supra note 319, at 165. 
321. See THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 265, at 229; Turnpike Realty v. Town of Dedham, 
362 Mass. 221, 284 N.E.2d 891 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1108 (1973); Assoc'd 
Homebuilders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal.3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 
94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971). 
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a larger area. 322 The trend toward state-wide and region-wide com-
prehensive planning is judicially recognized as a practical and 
reasonable means necessary to deal with the problems of modern 
society.323 As such, the presumption in its favor is not easily rebut-
table.324 
To summarize, judicial review of police power regulation initially 
focuses on whether the goal sought to be achieved is of the proper 
kind allowed under the police power, as opposed to eminent 
domain. 325 With the ever-broadening scope of the state's police 
power, this is not likely to be a difficult requirement to meet. The 
next consideration is whether the means used to attain this goal are 
unreasonable or arbitrary. There is a presumption in favor of 
legislative determinations, particularly when there is a comprehen-
sive plan involved; yet, this presumption is rebuttable. 
The final consideration in analyzing a potential "taking" is the ex-
tent to which the regulation interferes with property rights. Given a 
valid goal and a reasonable relationship between ends and means, 
the challenged regulation may still fail to survive judicial scrutiny if 
the interference with property rights is too severe. This second 
prong of the "taking" test-the "extent of interference" is-
sue-must be examined separately both because of the importance 
recent court decisions have placed on this factor and because the 
"taking" analysis has shifted from a "difference in kind" to a "dif-
ference in degree." 
B. Extent of Interference-"Difference in Degree" 
Over the years, courts and commentators have attempted to devise 
standards defining at what point a regulation becomes so extreme as 
to constitute a "taking." The conventional view is that any govern-
mental regulation that makes a private right essentially worthless is 
a "taking" of property. 326 The terminology used by the Supreme 
Court is that a regulation is so onerous as to constitute a "taking" if 
it "denies an owner economically viable use of his land;"327 or, more 
322. Steel Hill Dev. Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972) (court upheld 
local zoning measure as a "stop-gap," but considered it "crude"); Golden v. Planning Bd. of 
Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359,285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972) (court criticized 
legislature for failure to include a regional element in its zoning plan). 
323. Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.S.2d 359,375-76,285 N.E.2d 291,299-300, 
334 N.Y.S.2d 138,149-50 (1972); S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township ofMt. Laurel, 67 
N.J. 151, 173-91,336 A.2d 713, 724-34, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). 
324. See THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 265, at 229. 
325. See supra note 308 for a discussion of remedies. 
326. Sax, supra note 252, at 50. 
327. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
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commonly, if it does not permit the owner the "reasonable beneficial 
use" of his property.S28 Here, too, the courts have been unable to for-
mulate a precise rule as to when the facts of a particular case fall 
below the standard. Courts look at each individual case to decide 
what "justice and fairness" requires. S29 Thus, in an attempt to 
understand how the term "reasonable beneficial use" has been 
judicially construed, one must necessarily survey the vast amount of 
case law on the subject. sso 
1. Reasonable Beneficial Use 
It is well established that a police power regulation is not invalid 
simply because it prevents the highest and best use of the land. SSI 
Similarly, a showing that the regulated land might generate a more 
profitable return if it were free of restrictions does not diminish the 
community's power to regulate it in the manner chosen.ss2 Principles 
such as these, frequently espoused by courts and commentators, 
reflect the view that society is "drawing away from the 19th century 
idea that land's only function is to enable its owner to make 
money."sss It can no longer be assumed that a property owner has a 
constitutional right to use and develop land for any purpose which 
will result in personal profit, regardless of its effect on the public. SS4 
Although this trend strains against the weight of the Anglo-
American tradition of virtually unlimited property rights, the 
modern landowner's actions are, by necessity, restricted as a burden 
of living in a civilized society. SS5 Thus, the prevailing modern view is 
that only when the owner is deprived of all reasonable use of his 
property will the courts invalidate a restriction as unjust and 
unfair.sss 
328. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138. 
329. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
330. This survey of case law, to be accurate, must include decisions of federal and state 
courts of all levels. However, the emphasis in this article will be on United States Supreme 
Court decisons. 
331. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 125; Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 
at 592-93; City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 674, n.8 (1976); Am. 
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. County of Marin, 653 F.2d 364, 368 (9th Cir. 1981); /Jut c/, Vernon 
Park Realty v. City of Mt. Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 498-99, 121 N.E.2d 517, 519 (1954). 
332. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. at 66; Greene v. Town of Blooming Grove, 483 F.Supp. 804, 
807 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
333. QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 301, at 314-18. 
334. THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 265, at 240. 
335. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. at 67; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 
(1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 15 
Cal. 3d 508, 516, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 370, 542 P.2d 237, 242 (1975). 
336. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 262-63; Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 
136-38. 
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Judicial analysis of a potential constructive "taking"337 focuses on 
those factors which reflect the economic impact which the regulation 
has had on the property owner; particularly, the extent to which the 
regulation has interfered with the owner's "distinct investment-
backed expectations."338 One factor generally considered in this 
analysis is the diminution in property value caused by the 
regulation.339 However, most courts have held that even a dramatic 
loss in value is not essential or controlling340 in finding a "taking." 
Indeed, regulatory schemes which have deprived landowners of 
more than three quarters of their land value have been held not to 
constitute "takings. "341 In such cases, the courts imply that the 
owner's ability to realize the reduced value through sale of the prop-
erty indicates that a reasonable use remains.342 
Another factor generally considered by courts is whether the 
challenged regulation affects present or future uses.343 Interference 
with present uses has traditionally been the more compelling 
grounds on which to rest a "taking" claim. This is largely due to the 
speculative nature of the injury claimed when the interference is 
with future uses-namely, the loss of anticipated gains.344 In addi-
tion, the extent to which restrictions on future use actually infringes 
on property rights is questionable; an owner has no absolute or 
unlimited right to change the essential character of his land so as to 
use it for its most profitable purpose.345 Furthermore, landowners 
337. The term "constructive taking," as used in the text, refers to any "taking" which oc-
curs in a manner other than by formal eminent domain proceedings. 
338. The term "distinctive investment-backed expectations" as used by the Supreme Court 
seems to refer merely to an individual's reasonable expectation of economic return on an in-
vestment. See Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
339. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124; Agins, 447 U.S. at 262; Just v. Marinette 
County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 23, 201 N.W.2d 761,771 (1972); see also City of Eastlake v. Forest City 
Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976). 
340. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. at 66; Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131; Just v. 
Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d at 23,201 N.W.2d at 771; Am. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. County 
of Marin, 653 F.2d 364, 368 (9th Cir. 1981). 
341. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75 percent diminution in 
value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (87.5 percent diminution in value); 
McGowan v. Cohalan, 41 N.Y.2d 434, 361 N.E.2d 1025, 393 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1977) (79 percent 
decline in market value); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 15 Cal.3d 508, 
542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975) (81 percent diminution in value). 
342. See supra note 341. Some courts have emphasized that impairment of saleability is not 
to be confused or equated with destruction of reasonable use unless reduction in marketability 
closely approaches zero. E.g., Schnack v. State, 160 N.J. Super. 343, 389 A.2d 1006 (App. 
Div.), certif. denied, 78 N.J. 401, 396 A.2d 587 (1978). 
343. E.g., Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 136; Sibson v. State, 115 N.H. 124, 129, 
336 A.2d 239, 243 (1975). 
344. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. at 66. 
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have no vested right in existing or anticipated zoning ordinances346 
as the history of zoning law makes change foreseeable. 347 The denial 
of the right to exploit a property interest previously believed to be 
available for development is "quite simply untenable" as the basis 
for a successful "taking" challenge.348 
Just how the courts apply this potpourri of legal principles may be 
understood through an examination of the "taking" analysis recent-
ly applied by the Supreme Court in Penn Central v. New York 
City.349 At issue in this case was an ordinance placing various 
development restrictions on an urban landmark-New York City's 
Grand Central Station-while at the same time allowing for the 
transfer of the owners' unused development rights to nearby or adja-
cent land.350 The owners brought suit when they were denied per-
mission to build a multistoried office building above the historic ter-
minaJ.351 Neither the validity of the City's objectives352 nor the ap-
propriateness of the means used to achieve those goals353 were 
disputed. Thus, the issue before the Court was whether the in-
terference with the owners' rights was of such an extreme 
magnitude so as to deprive them of all reasonable beneficial use of 
the property. 354 
The Court, in analyzing the issue, placed a heavy burden on the 
claimant to show that all reasonable beneficial use of the property 
had been denied and that no reasonable return was possible under 
56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Con-
servation & Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970). 
346. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 15 Cal.3d -508, 516, 542 P.2d 
237,242, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365, 370 (1975). 
347. [d., 15 Cal.3d at 521,542 P.2d at 246,125 Cal. Rptr. at 374. Theoretically, the chance 
of change in the zoning laws is to be reflected in the price of the property. 
348. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130. 
349. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
350. Specifically, the restrictions placed on owners of designated historic landmarks pur-
suant to the Landmark Preservation Law consists of keeping the building'S exterior in "good 
repair" and requiring Commission approval before exterior alterations are made. The owners 
of Grand Central Station were denied approval of their plans for the construction of a 
mUltistory office building over the terminal because the plan would be destructive of the ter-
minal's historic and aesthetic features. The owners filed suit claiming their property had been 
"taken" in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. See Penn Central Transp. Co., 
438 U.S. at 107-19. 
351. [d. at 116-17. 
352. [d. at 129. The City's objective in enacting such an ordinance was to "protect historic 
landmarks and neighborhoods from precipitate decisions to destroy or fundamentally alter 
their character." The citizens of New York City would thereby benefit culturally, economical-
ly, intellectually, and aesthetically. [d. at 109. 
353. [d. at 129. Therefore, it was not necessary for the Court to apply the first prong of the 
"taking" analysis. 
354. [d. at 136. 
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any of the uses permitted.355 Under the facts of the case, the Court 
held that the claimant had fallen far short of meeting this burden.356 
The Landmark Preservation Law was found not to interfere with 
the owners' "primary expectation"357 concerning their use of the 
parcel, as the ordinance both allowed and encouraged the continua-
tion of the terminal's present uses.35S Thus, although disapproval of 
the planned tower construction359 would cause the owners to lose an 
estimated $3 million in annual office rentals, the facts showed that 
the terminal itself provided a "reasonable return" of approximately 
$1 million in annual net rentals.360 Furthermore, there was no show-
ing that the owners had been denied all use of the air development 
rights above the terminal. The Court reasoned that, while the con-
struction plan for a large office tower had not gained Commission 
approval, there was no evidence to suggest that the construction of a 
smaller, more harmonious addition would not be allowed.361 Even to 
the extent that the owners had been denied the right to build above 
the terminal, the Court found that the preexisting air rights could 
still be put to some use-they could be transferred.362 The net result 
of all these factors was the Court's conclusion that the regulation 
had not effected a "taking" and that, indeed, the landmark's owners 
had retained significantly more than the minimum reasonable 
beneficial use of their property. 363 
Penn Central is an important case in that it identifies a number of 
factors which the Court focuses on when evaluating the extent of 
regulatory interference. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's more 
355. Id.; Williams v. Town of Oyster Bay, 32 N.Y.2d 78,295 N.E.2d 788, 343 N.Y.S.2d 118 
(1973). 
356. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138. 
357. Id. at 136. 
358. Id. 
359. See supra text and note at note 351. 
360. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 116. In fact, the appellants did not challenge the 
factual determination of the lower courts that the terminal income itself was a "reasonable 
return" on the owners' investment. See id. at 129. One must assume that appellants misjudged 
the significance of this finding. 
361. Id. at 136-37. The possibility that a construction plan might be approved in the future 
serves a similar ·function to "special permit" provisions included in certain comprehensive zon-
ing regulations. The fact that a property owner has the option of applying for a special use per-
mit is often cited as "one more reason" for the court to declare that the regulation has not 
gone too far. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d at 22,201 N.W.2d at 770-71; Am. 
Dredging Co. v. State, 169 N.J. Super. 18,21,404 A.2d 42, 44 (App. Div. 1979); Sands Point 
Harbor, Inc. v. Sullivan, 136 N.J. Super. 436, 441, 346 A.2d 612, 614 (App. Div. 1975). 
362. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 137. See infra Section IV(BX2) for a more de-
tailed discussion of transferable development rights. 
363. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 138. 
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recent pronouncements on the "taking" issue have contributed little 
towards clarifying the Court's concept of reasonable beneficial 
use.364 One case worth noting, however, is Agins v. City of 
Tiburon. 366 In Agins, the owners of a five-acre parcel of prime 
residential property challenged a California land use regulation 
which limited development on the parcel to a range of one to five 
dwelling units.366 The Supreme Court held that under this ordinance 
the owners had remained "free to pursue their reasonable invest-
ment expectations" and, therefore, had not been denied the "justice 
and fairness" guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments.367 It is unclear from the Court's brief opinion what 
specific factors led the Court to this conclusion;368 however, the con-
clusion itself, given the stringency of the challenged regulation ,369 
suggests just how low the threshold for establishing "reasonable 
beneficial use" has become. 
The Court in Agins appeared to stress that this was not a case 
where an ordinance has prohibited all development, thereby 
designating claimants' land as "open space."370 Therefore, although 
the Court has, in previous cases,371 indicated what it considers to be 
reasonable use, it has not yet reached the question of whether a 
regulation designating property as open space renders this land so 
"use-less" to the owner as to constitute a "taking."372 In anticipa-
tion of the resolution of this question, or perhaps as a means to avoid 
364. See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 
444 U.S. 164 (1979); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 
255 (1980). 
365. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
366. [d. at 257. The claimants would be allowed to build one to five houses only after a 
development plan was submitted to, and approved by, local officials. At the time the case was 
decided, the property owners had submitted no such development plan. [d. 
367. [d. at 262-63. 
368. The opinion is rather like a collection of general "taking" principles-many extracted 
from the Penn Central opinion-with little reference to the facts of the case itself. 
369. If local officials allow the Agins to develop their land to the fullest extent permissible 
under the statute, they will be able to build only one dwelling unit per acre of "prime residen-
tial property." Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 262. 
370. [d. at 262-63. 
371. E.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, rehearing denied, 439 
U.S. 883 (1978). 
372. In a recent "taking" case, Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), the Supreme Court 
presented an opinion comprised of broad statements and interesting analogies which, at first 
glance, might appear to indicate in which direction the Court is leaning on this issue. The 
Court wrote that "where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction 
of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its en-
tirety." [d. at 66. Therefore, applied to the land use regulation context, the one "strand" 
destroyed might be the right to develop; whereas the remaining strands-the rights to hold, 
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it, land use planners are beginning to utilize transferable develop-
ment rights in an attempt to mitigate the financial burden placed on 
landowners by regulation. Yet, it remains to be seen whether the 
Court will find that TDR's are of sufficient value in themselves as to 
be of reasonable beneficial use to an owner of tightly-regulated land. 
2. TDR's as Reasonable Beneficial Use 
As mentioned earlier,373 judicial commentary on the validity of the 
TDR concept has been limited to two cases: Fred F. French Invest-
ment Co., Inc. v. City of New York;374 and Penn Central. 375 
The first of the TDR "taking" challenges-Fred F. French Invest-
ment Co., Inc. v. City of New York376-went before the New York 
Court of Appeals in 1976. In this case, the challenged ordinance 
rezoned two "buildable private parks" which had been part of a Man-
hattan residential complex (Tudor City) into parks open to the public. 
Simultaneous with this rezoning, the owners were given the right to 
transfer their development rights to designated "receiving lots" 
which would then be allowed to enjoy an increased floor area ratio 
density.371 This zoning regulation expressly prohibited any and all 
future development of the park property. Therefore, the TDR's were 
the only vehicle remaining through which the owners could profit.378 
On the basis of these facts, the court struck down the zoning or-
dinance, holding that the park owners had been unreasonably de-
prived of the use of their property. 379 
transfer, or devise, for example-would presumably be sufficient to prevent a taking from oc-
curring_ 
A broad application of the "bundle-strands" model in this manner would represent a bold 
step on the part of the Court. More likely, the Court will seize the opportunity to limit Andrus 
to its rather unusual facts. The claimant, a vendor of artifacts produced from bald eagle parts, 
challenged the constitutionality of a regulation which prohibited the sale or purchase of such 
articles. Although the language of the opinion is broad, and the Court cites land-use taking 
cases in the text, in the final paragraphs the Court goes out of its way to characterize the 
challenged regulation as one of many "regulations that bar trade." Id. at 67. That the Court 
did not utilize the "bundle-strands" model in Agins v. City of Tiburon, a subsequent land-use 
regulation case, suggests that the Court will be hesitant to extend the use of the model beyond 
the scope of trade regulation challenges. 
373. See supra text and notes at notes 240-44. 
374. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 
(1976). 
375. 438 U.S. 104, rehearing denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978). 
376. 39 N.Y.2d 587,350 N.E.2d 381,385 N.Y.2d 5, appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 990 (1976). 
377. FredF. FrerwhInv. Co., 39 N.Y.2d at 590-93,350 N.E.2d at 383-84,385 N.Y.S.2d at 
7-8. 
378. Id., 39 N.Y.2d at 590-93, 350 N.E.2d at 383-84, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 6-8. 
379. Id., 39 N.Y.2d at 600,350 N.E.2d at 389,385 N.Y.S.2d at 13. 
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Chief Judge Breitel,380 writing for the majority, criticized the or-
dinance for requiring private landowners to maintain public parks. 
The majority ruled that the ordinance deprived the owners of all 
property rights except the "bare title and a dubious future reversion 
of full use."381 Taking into consideration all of the factors except 
TDR's, the opinion of the court was that the restricted property had 
been drained of all reasonable use and so had been virtually 
"taken."382 Therefore, when examining the TDR's and their poten-
tial value to the park's owners, the court was concerned with 
whether the TDR's provided the owners with some degree of com-
pensation for their 10ss.383 Viewed by the court in this compensatory 
light, these development rights, severed from the land, were too ab-
stract, and their value too speculative,384 to meet constitutional 
standards. In making such a determination, the court emphasized 
that the receiving lot had yet to be identified, acquired, and approved 
by administrative agencies-any of which might never occur because 
of "exigencies of the market" and "contingencies and exigencies of 
administrative action."385 Thus, although the court admitted that de-
velopment rights were a "potentially valuable and even a transfer-
able commodity, " 386 under the facts of this particular case the use of 
TDR's was not to be given judicial approval. 
One year later, the Supreme Court addressed the TDR issue in 
Penn Central, with quite a different outcome-the Court gave a 
380. One year later, Chief Judge Breitel was to author the Court of Appeals opinion in the 
Penn Central case. 
381. Fred F. French Inv. Co., 39 N.Y.2d at 597, 385 N.E.2d at 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11. 
382. By ordering the property owners to maintain public parks, the zoning ordinance had 
rendered the property "unsuitable for any reasonable income productive or other private use 
for which it is adapted." Id., 39 N.Y.2d at 597, 350 N.E.2d at 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11. This 
part of the court's rationale, although couched in "reasonable use" terms, has more to do with 
the "kind" of interference caused by the regulation. In essence, the court seems to object to 
private individuals being required to perform a public function-an unacceptable end for police 
power regulation. See supra Section IV(A). 
383. The language of the court suggests that perhaps the value of TDR's would not have 
had to rise exactly to the level of just compensation-i.e. equal to the value of the development 
rights attached to unrestricted land-in order to have prevented the invalidation of the or-
dinance. However, the standard applied was significantly higher than that of "reasonable 
use." For a fuller discussion of the just compensation/reasonable use distinction, see infra text 
and notes at notes 396-402. 
384. These "disembodied abstractions of man's ingenuity" were to "float in a limbo until 
restored to reality by reattachment to tangible real property." Fred F. French Inv. Co., 39 
N.Y.2d at 598, 350 N.E.2d at 388, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11. 
385. Id. 
386. FredF. French Inv. Co., 39 N.Y.2d at 597,350 N.E.2d at 387,385 N.Y.S.2d at 11; see 
also Newport Assoc., Inc. v. Solow, 30 N.Y.2d 263,283 N.E.2d 600,332 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1972) 
(J. Brietel, concurring) (air development rights are "a valuable asset"), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 
931 (1973). 
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favorable review of New York City's application of the TDR concept. 
The landmark preservation ordinance under constitutionall attack in 
Penn Central contained a provision whereby development rights 
could be transferred from the regulated landmark to property on ad-
jacent blocks.387 The Grand Central development rights were, 
therefore, transferable to at least eight nearby parcels, several of 
which had been deemed "suitable for the construction of new office 
buildings."388 Thus, while noting that the TDR program was far 
from ideal,389 the Supreme Court agreed with the finding of the New 
York Court of Appeals390 that "at least in the case of the Terminal, 
the [transferable development] rights afforded are valuable."391 As 
such, the Court stated that these rights "undoubtedly mitigate 
whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants and, 
for that reason, are to be taken into account in considering the im-
pact of regulation."392 This language seems to suggest that the ex-
istence of the transferable development rights, and their accompany-
ing economic value to the terminal owners, were important in 
preventing the landmark ordinance from being held to be a 
"taking." In other words, these valuable TDR's were some evidence 
that a "reasonable beneficial use" remained. 
While the language used by the Supreme Court in its discussion of 
TDR's was favorable, it must be noted that the Court relegated the 
matter of TDR's to a single paragraph of dicta.393 Yet, the Court's 
limited statement is still helpful in anticipating what stand the Court 
will eventually take when it chooses to address the constitutionality 
of TDR's directly. Although any decision by the high Court will likely 
turn on the particular mechanics of the challenged TDR program, 
given a proper, workable transfer system,394 it appears likely that 
the Supreme Court will hold that TDR's constitute a valuable asset 
for those landowners who possess them.395 
387. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 113-14. 
388. Id. at 137. 
389. Id. The New York Court of Appeals described some of the program's many defects: 
"The area to which transfer is permitted is severely limited, complex procedures are required 
to obtain a transfer permit, and the program, it has been said, has the unfortunate conse-
quence of encouraging large, bulky buildings around landmarks which are dwarfed by com-
parison." Penn Central Transp. Co., 42 N.Y.2d at 335,366 N.E.2d at 1277, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 
920. 
390. Penn Central Transp. Co., 42 N.Y.2d at 324,366 N.E.2d at 1271,397 N.Y.S.2d at 914. 
391. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 137. 
392. Id. 
393. Id. 
394. Just what such a program might entail is discussed infra Section V(B). 
395. See Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 137. 
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It does not appear that the factual differences between French396 
and Penn Central397 account for the significant disparity in their out-
comes. Rather, the difference lies in the modes of analyses used. In 
Penn Central, the Supreme Court viewed the value of the TDR's as a 
factor bearing on the issue of whether or not a "taking" had oc-
curred in the first place-i.e., whether reasonable use remained.398 
In contrast, the view of the court in French was that the TDR's were 
only to become a factor once the court found that a "taking" had oc-
curred.399 At that point, the court would have to find that TDR's con-
stituted "just compensation" for the "taking," or else strike down 
the regulation as unconstitutiona1.40o "Just compensation" is a 
higher standard than that of "reasonable use." This fact is il-
lustrated by the Court's statement in Penn Central that, although 
the TDR's undoubtedly mitigated the financial burden imposed by 
regulation, they "may well not have constituted 'just compensation' 
if a 'taking' had occurred."401 Therefore, if the Supreme Court in 
Penn Central had characterized TDR's as a method of compensation, 
rather than a means of mitigation, the likelihood of any TDR's pro-
gram meeting the requisite constitutional standard would have been 
small indeed.402 
396. See supra text and notes at notes 207-10, 376-86. 
397. See supra text and notes at notes 196-99, 349-63, 387-88. 
398. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 137. 
399. See supra text and notes at notes 380-86. The issues as framed for appeal by the Penn 
Central Transport Company were: 
(1) whether the restrictions imposed by New York City's law upon appellants' 
exploitation of the Terminal site effect a 'taking' of appellants' property for a 
public use within the meaning of the Fifth [and] Fourteenth Amendments, and, 
(2) if so, whether the transferable development rights afforded appellants con-
stitute 'just compensation' within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 
Id. at 122 (citations omitted). 
400. Fred F. French Inv. Co., 39 N.Y.2d at 596-99,350 N.E.2d at 387-88, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 
10-12. 
401. Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 137. Case law suggests that the chances of satis-
fying the higher standard of "just compensation" are even lower than the Penn Central opin-
ion seems to admit. "Just compensation" requires that the "full and exact equivalent" of the 
market value of the property "at the time of the taking [be] contemporaneously paid in 
money." Olsen v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 254-55 (1934). This principle has been strictly 
enforced, resulting in the invalidation of statutes which attempted to provide for payment of 
"just compensation" by something other than money, such as warrants, or stocks and bonds 
(Gardiner v. Henderson, 103 Ariz. 420, 443 P.2d 416 (1968); Martin v. Tyler, 4 N.D. 278, 60 
N.W. 392 (1894)), or other land (La. Power and Light Co. v. Lasseigne, 220 So. 2d 462 (La. Ct. 
App. 1969)). Consider how TDR's would fare under such scrutiny. 
402. The appellants in Penn Central gambled on the fact that the Court would apply a 
higher-than-reasonable-use standard. They chose not to challenge the Court of Appeals' deter-
mination that the terminal, as it was, could earn a "reasonable return" and that the TDR's 
were "valuable." Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 129. Therefore, when the Supreme 
Court decided to consider not only the terminal's income, but also the value of the TDR's, in 
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Examination of the limited judicial review of TDR's suggests the 
following: the courts are willing to admit that development rights, 
even those severed from property, are valuable;403 and, under the 
right circumstances, it is likely that TDR's will be considered accept-
able as a form of "reasonable beneficial use" sufficient to prevent a 
"taking." Thus, the constitutionality of land use regulations utilizing 
TDR's will ultimately turn on the specifics of each individual pro-
gram. 
V. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PINELANDS PLAN AND 
PINE LANDS DEVELOPMENT CREDITS 
A. The "Kind" of Regulation: Is There a 
Proper Police Power Goal? 
As seen in the progression of cases from Euclid404 to Agins,405 the 
Supreme Court has, over the years, dramatically increased the range 
of goals deemed properly attainable by use of state and local police 
powers.406 In its most recent pronouncement in this area, the Court 
in Agins summarily acknowledged the legitimacy of the city's in-
terest in protecting its residents from the "ill effects of 
urbanization,"407 such as the "disturbance of the ecology and en-
vironment."408 The matter-of-fact manner in which the Court ac-
cepted as valid the goal behind the strict zoning regulation illustrates 
just how far the Court has moved in the past several decades.409 It 
now seems apparent that the Court will scrutinize less strictly the 
motives behind state and local government actions designed to pro-
tect the general welfare. The complexities and problems of the 
modern world, so insightfully recognized by Justice Holmes in 
1926,410 have necessitated judicial acceptance of stated goals as 
valid, absent strong evidence to the contrary. 
assessing whether the property had been "taken" in the first place, the appellants' case was 
lost. 
403. There is some evidence which suggests that, in certain cases, severed development 
rights will be even more valuable than rights attached to land. One authority reports that the 
"Phillip Morris Corporation paid more per foot for development rights than it would have for 
land when it built at the Southwest corner of 42nd Street and Park Avenue." Ross REPORT, 
supra note 179, at 97. 
404. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 262 U.S. 365 (1926); see supra text at notes 
288-92. 
405. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
406. See supra Section IV(A). 
407. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261. See supra text and notes at notes 365-70. 
408. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261, n.8. 
409. See id. at 260-62. 
410. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 262 U.S. at 386-87. 
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The specific goals of the Pinelands Plan, as discussed above,411 are 
to preserve and protect the natural, historic, and cultural resources 
of the Pine Barrens, while at the same time accommodating the 
development needs of the area.412 These goals do not significantly 
differ from those pursued in Agins.413 Both the Pinelands Reserve 
system and the challenged density restrictions in Agins414 were 
legislative attempts to promote orderly future development by dis-
couraging the "premature and unnecessary conversion of open-
space land to urban uses."415 Since this goal was unhesitatingly 
declared to be legitimate in Agins,416 it seems likely that the same 
will hold true regarding the Pinelands. Furthermore, the need to 
avoid piecemeal development and the resulting environmental 
degradation of the region was recognized by both the federal and 
New Jersey legislatures. 417 Thus, there is an extremely strong 
presumption that the legislative determination is correct and, 
therefore, should stand.418 
In addition, the means chosen by the federal and state legisla-
tures to achieve the desired end-a regional comprehensive land use 
management plan-has been recognized, and indeed recom-
mended,419 by the courts as a presumptively nonarbitrary and rea-
sonable method of regulation to which judicial deference is generally 
shown.42o Thus, it appears that every available presumption favors 
judicial validation of both the goals and the means chosen by the pro-
tectors of the Pinelands. Furthermore, there is virtually no evidence 
to suggest how these presumptions might be overcome. An opponent 
of the Plan might claim, as is often done,421 that such a strict regula-
tory program has as an impermissible goal, or at least as an intended 
consequence, exclusion of certain "undesirable" groupS.422 How-
ever, the Pinelands Plan emphasizes the fact that the degree of de-
411. See supra text and notes at notes 132-36. 
412. See CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 193-94. 
413. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261-62. 
414. [d. at 257; see also supra text and note at note 366. 
415. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261. Similar language is used throughout the Pinelands Plan. See, 
e.g., CMP, supra note 2 at xix. 
416. Agins, 447 U.S. at 261-62. 
417. National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, § 502, 16 U.S.C. §§ 471i(a),(b) (Supp. III 
1979); Pinelands Protection Act, N.J. REV. STAT. § 13:18A-2 (Supp. 1980). 
418. Note that the local ordinance upheld in Agins was prepared pursuant to state law. 
Thus, the Agins restrictions and the Pinelands Plan also have somewhat similar legislative 
origins. 
419. See cases cited supra note 322. 
420. See supra text and notes at notes 319-24. 
421. See cases cited supra note 315. 
422. See supra text and notes at notes 314-18. 
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velopment in the Pinelands as a whole will not be limited.423 Rather, 
the pattern of development will merely be shifted to different areas 
in order to minimize possible negative effects on the environment. 
Therefore, this exclusionary argument seems unlikely to succeed. 
Thus, in light of the recent expansive judicial view of the police 
power,424 it is likely that the goals of the Pinelands program will be 
upheld as valid. A modern court would be in the minority if it were to 
hold such a program to be an eminent domain action "in disguise." It 
appears, then, that the vulnerability of the Pinelands Plan lies not in 
its intentions, but in its resultant effect on the property rights of in-
dividuallandholders. Thus, the bulk of the Court's "taking" analysis 
will entail evaluating the extent of interference and determining 
whether that interference is too severe to let stand. It is to this issue 
which this article now turns. 
B. The Extent of Interference: 
Does "Reasonable Beneficial Use" Remain? 
1. The Preservation Area 
The Preservation Area, at the core of the Pinelands, is the most 
strictly-regulated acreage in the Reserve,425 and, as such, it is 
perhaps the most likely target of a "'taking" claim. Development in 
this area is prohibited, except by permits granted upon a showing of 
sufficient ties to the land or to long-term residents.426 Land use is 
restricted to traditional Pinelands activities such as agriculture, 
forestry, resource extraction, and beekeeping.427 
Although restrictive, these development and land use standards do 
not appear to deprive landowners of all reasonable use of their land 
as defined by the courts. First, no present use of the land is pro-
hibited; rather, only those uses which might have arisen in the future 
are effected. The Preservation Area landowner has no vested right 
in a future use, particularly if it would alter the essential character of 
the land.428 For those who have lived in the Pinelands for genera-
tions and whose livelihood is derived from the land, this loss of possi-
423. See eMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 197-200. 
424. See supra Section IV(A). 
425. See supra text and notes at notes 146-52, 163-66; also, eMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 
201-09. Note that the Preservation Area is comprised of the Preservation Area District and 
Special Agricultural Production Areas as well as part of the Agricultural Production Area. See 
supra text and notes at notes 146-52, 163-66. 
426. See supra text and notes at notes 150-52. 
427. See eMP, supra note 2, pt. II, §§ 5-302, 5-304, 5-305, 5-309. 
428. See supra text and notes at notes 344-48, 163-66. 
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ble future land uses is not likely to create a conflict. The very 
uniqueness of the Pinelands natives is their desire to avoid change 
and to continue an isolated existence in the "Piney" tradition. The 
prohibition on development is, therefore, not something highly objec-
tionable, but is perhaps more likely to be appreciated by the majority 
of the populace. As to land uses, the traditional land uses of the 
Pinelands are allowed under the Plan,429 and so a resident's ac-
tivities will be left largely undisturbed. Thus, a person who has been 
able to live off the land for many years may continue to do so. 
Because of this, Pinelands natives in general are not likely to be the 
plaintiffs in any future "taking" action. 
The same, however, will not be true for those Preservation Area 
landowners who hold property as a speculative investment. 
Speculators invest their money with an eye to the future and, 
therefore, will be most affected by the Plan's restrictions. As such, 
they are the most likely challengers of the Plan. Yet, these land-
owners have no greater "right" to future land use than do native 
Pinelanders. Inherent in the concept of speculation is the 
foreseeability that there will be change; just as society refuses to re-
fund the price of a losing sweepstake ticket,430 so must the courts 
refuse to compensate the "losing" speculator-landholder. Both 
Pinelander and speculator must be judged by the same reasonable 
use standard despite the disparity in the perceived losses. Thus, the 
program's permitted land uses which afford the resident-landowner 
a legally acceptable return of value must be deemed to provide the 
speculator-landowner with the same. 
A second aspect of the Plan suggests that reasonable use remains 
for Preservation Area land-the Plan's provisions for permits431 and 
waivers.432 A true Pinelander may, through the "Piney" excep-
tion,433 be allowed to engage in limited development. Also, a Pine-
lands landowner may submit a proposal for an alternative land use 
not specifically provided for in the Plan, but consistent with its provi-
sions.434 If a permit is denied, the Plan provides for reconsideration 
and judicial review435 of the Commission's decision. In the first six 
months of the Program's implementation, approval was granted for 
429. See supra text at note 149. 
430. Michelman, Property. Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1238 (1967). 
431. See CMP, supra note 2, pt. II, §§ 4-101 to 4-104. 
432. See CMP, supra note 2, pt. II, §§ 4-501 to 4-507. 
433. See supra text and notes at notes 150-52; see also CMP, supra note 2, pt. II, § 5-302(A). 
434. See CMP, supra note 2, pt. II, §§ 4-101 to 4-104. 
435. CMP, supra note 2, pt. II, §§ 4-801 to 4-802. 
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twelve new homes and five other commercial/industrial uses; there 
have been no denials.436 The existence of a functioning permit 
system which expands the landowner's scope of future land use op-
tions is a factor looked upon with favor by the courtS.437 The possibil-
ity that a landowner can, by permit, put his property to yet another 
use places a formidable obstacle in the path of a claimant who must 
prove that no reasonable use remains. 
The Pinelands Plan also provides for the waiver of strict com-
pliance with its provisions where those restrictions "create an extra-
ordinary hardship or where [their] waiver is necessary to serve a 
compelling public need."438 Included in the standards specified for 
granting such waivers is the situation whereby an individual's prop-
erty is not capable of yielding a reasonable return if used or 
developed as authorized by the provisions of the Plan.439 This waiver 
provision acts as a constitutional "safety net" which the Commission 
can fall back on in any case where the landowner successfully proves 
that his land, because of circumstances unique to that parcel, cannot 
provide him with a reasonable return. There is evidence to date that 
the Commission is very willing to utilize this option when necessary. 
In the Program's initial six months, two thirds of the waivers sought 
were granted.440 Although environmentalists might claim that the 
spirit of the Comprehensive Plan is being undercut by allowing so 
many exceptions, a court is likely to approve of the Commission's at-
tempts to stay firmly on the constitutional side of the "taking" line. 
A third, and particularly significant, aspect of the Pinelands Plan 
which suggests that reasonable use remains is the Pinelands 
Development Credit (PDC) Program.441 The PDC's allotted to 
Preservation Area landowners442 may be utilized in anyone of three 
ways. These credits may be held unused by the owner, applied to the 
owner's land which lies in a Regional Growth Area, or sold on the 
436. The Pinelander, Aug. 31, 1981, No. 14, at 3 (newsletter of the New Jersey Pinelands 
Commission) [hereinafter cited as The Pinelander]. 
437. See supra note 361. 
438. CMP, supra note 2, pt. II, § 4-501. 
439. [d. S 4-505(A)(1). 
440. The Pinelander, supra note 436, at 3. Of the 32 requests submitted, 48 were approved. 
It is unclear from the information provided how many of these waivers were granted in the 
Preservation Area as opposed to the Protection Area. However, the end result is the forthcom-
ing construction of 791 new homes in the Pinelands. [d. 
441. See CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 210-12; see supra Section III(B). 
442. PDC's are allotted to landowners in the Preservation Area District, Special 
Agricultural Production Areas, and Agricultural Production Areas. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I 
at 210. The latter area is comprised of acreage in both the Preservation Area and the Protec-
tion Area. This discussion should be considered relevant as to all PDC holders, whether they 
fall inside or outside the core area. 
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open market to a Regional Growth Area landowner. With each 
scenario, the potential exists for the Preservation Area landowner to 
realize economic benefit.443 
Whether or not the PDC value can be realized depends on the 
mechanics of the transfer system. In this case, the mechanics appear 
to be sound. The major fault of most transferable development rights 
systems is the provision of an insufficient area to which the TDR's 
may be transferred. 444 The Pinelands TDR system provides receiv-
ing areas-the Regional Growth Areas-which encompass well over 
100,000 acres of land spread throughout the region. 445 A receiving 
area of this magnitude obviously contains a great number of poten-
tial buyers for the PDC's, an element essential to any viable transfer 
system. Furthermore, there appears to be a demand for increased 
density development in the Growth Areas sufficient to create an ac-
tive market for PDC'S,446 thereby prompting the actual transfer of 
these as yet intangible assets. The Pinelands Growth Areas have 
been designated as such because they are most affected by the pres-
ent regional growth influences and, therefore, have the greatest 
estimated future housing needs in the area.447 The base development 
densities set by the Plan's regulations448 are insufficient in 
themselves to satisfy future housing needs. Thus, the bonus units' 
made available through the transfer of PDC's will be needed to ac-
commodate the housing demand created by the area's rising popula-
tion. The demand for PDC's, therefore, should be great. 
In order to make the transfer of PDC's attractive to the Preserva-
tion Area owner, the number of PDC's allotted has been calculated 
to fall far below the predicted demand for bonus units,449 thereby en-
couraging competition for each available PDC. The limited supply of 
PDC's insures that, absent severely erroneous predictions on the 
part of the Pinelands Commission450 or a plain "bad deal" on the 
443. In the case of a landowner who holds on to his PDC's, given a viable transfer system, 
the value potential exists even though the holder chooses not to realize it. 
444. Economic Analysis, supra note 175, at 13. This was explicitly identified as a defect in 
the Penn Central system, 42 N.Y. 324, 335, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1277, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914, 920 
(1977), and was implicitly recognized in Fred F. French Inv. Co., 39 N.Y.2d at 587, 350 N.E.2d 
at 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 5. 
445. See CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 206, Table 7.2. 
446. See supra text and notes at notes 232-37. 
447. See supra Section II(A)(2). Of course, environmental criteria was also used in 
delineating the Regional Growth Area boundaries. Those areas already fragmented by 
piecemeal development were chosen so that the gaps could be filled in an orderly manner with 
minimal environmental damage. See CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 205-07. 
448. See supra text and notes at notes 170-74. 
449. See supra text and notes at notes 235-37. 
450. A certain amount of error was provided for in the calculations themselves because of 
their speculative nature. 
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part of the transferor, each credit should provide its holder with a 
reasonable return when sold. There is no guarantee that the value of 
the PDC will approximate the return which the development rights 
might have produced if used on the original site. However, as seen 
earlier, it is not "just compensation" which is constitutionally re-
quired, but merely a fair return.461 
The PDC Program was formulated so as to avoid two additional 
common TDR defects criticized by courts462 and commentators463-
namely, excessive administrative "red tape" and insufficient public 
knowledge. Either of these defects could sufficiently discourage the 
active transfer of PDC's despite the proper mix of supply and de-
mand. The Pinelands Plan, therefore, requires local authorities to 
devise clear standards to expedite utilization of the credits454 and to 
thoroughly distribute information about the Plan to the interested 
public.465 Such actions should promote the efficient and economically 
beneficial transfer of development credits by injecting a much 
needed dose of stability into the entire process. This, in addition to 
the above-mentioned factors, virtually assures that each landowner 
will have the opportunity to put his development rights to a 
reasonable use. 
Thus, analysis of the Preservation Area restrictions leads one to 
the conclusion that landowners under the Pinelands Plan are not be-
ing denied the reasonable beneficial use of their land. Present uses 
are allowed to continue. Alternative uses consistent with the provi-
sions of the Comprehensive Plan might be allowed by special permit; 
in certain cases where extreme hardship would r.esult, waivers can 
be issued. Finally, even those property development rights rendered 
useless within the Preservation Area may, through the utilization of 
the PDC Program, be used in a reasonably beneficial manner. 
Therefore, a "taking" challenge by a Preservation Area landowner 
seems destined to fail. 
2. The Protection Area 
The land which lies within the Protection Area456 is far less re-
stricted under the Pinelands Plan than that in the Preservation 
451. See supra text and notes at notes 396-402. 
452. See Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 104; FredF. French Inv. Co." 39 N.Y.2d at 
587,350 N.E.2d at 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 5. 
453. E.g., Marcus, A Comparative Look at TDR, Subdivision Exactions, and Zoning as En-
vironmental Preservation Panaceas: The Search for Dr. Jekyll without Mr. Hyde, 20 URB. L. 
ANN. 3 (1980); Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban 
Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972). 
454. See supra text and note at note 238. 
455. See supra text and note at note 239. 
456. This includes the Forest Area, Rural Development Areas, and Regional Growth Areas, 
as well as most of the Agricultural Production Areas. See supra text and notes at notes 152-73. 
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Area. Development in this area is allowed to a specified degree, with 
the allowable density being dependent on the environmental charac-
teristics of each land use planning area.457 Land uses similar to those 
allowed in the Preservation Area are allowed in the surrounding 
area; in addition, other land uses may, at the option of each munici-
pality, be permitted. These include institutional uses, Pinelands 
resource-related industries, airport facilities, campgrounds, and 
other specified activities.458 A Protection Area landowner who is 
unhappy with the restrictions on his land may, like his counterpart in 
the Preservation Area, apply for a special permit459 or, under unique 
circumstances, a waiver.46o Thus, it appears highly unlikely that a 
landowner under these conditions could satisfy his burden on prov-
ing that his land had been deprived of all reasonable use. 
Perhaps the landowners with the strongest argument that their 
land has been "taken" are those residing in the Forest Area.461 The 
Forest Area, because it possesses the "essential character"462 of the 
Pinelands, has the most severe development density restrictions in 
the Protection Area-only one dwelling unit is allowed for every 15.8 
acres held.463 And, unlike the neighboring Agriculture Production 
Areas which are held to a lesser standard (one unit per 10 acres),464 
Forest Area owners are not allotted TDR's to mitigate their 
burden.465 While at first glance this appears to be troublesome incon-
sistency, there is some justification for the Plan's provisions. The 
one unit allowed for every ten acres of Agricultural land must be 
part of an active farm;466 whereas there is no such restriction on the 
one dwelling unit permitted for every 15.8 acres of Forest Area 
land.467 Thus, the Forest Area landowner, although he may build 
fewer units, has more freedom as to the type of dwelling unit he may 
ultimately build. 
While this distinction between development in Agricultural Areas 
and Forest Areas might not fully justify allocating TDR's to the 
457. The Forest Area is allowed one dwelling unit per 15.8 acres; the Agricultural Produc-
tion Areas, one unit per 10 acres; Rural Development Areas, one unit per 3.2 acres; and in 
Regional Growth Areas, one to three and one-half units per acre. See CMP, supra note 2, pt. II, 
§§ 5-303, 5-304, 5-306, 5-308. 
458. [d. §§ 5-303(B), 5-304(B), 5-306(B). 
459. See supra text and notes at notes 431-37. 
460. See supra text and notes at notes 438-40. 
461. See supra text and notes at notes 153-61. One commentator has predicted that the 
Forest Area restrictions will not withstand constitutional scrutiny. Greenbaum, New Jersey's 
Pinelands Plan and the "Taking" Question, 7 COLUM. ENV. L.J. 227 (1981). 
462. CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 195. 
463. See supra text and notes at notes 153-61; see also CMP, supra note 2, pt. I at 202. 
464. See supra text and notes at notes 163-66. 
465. See CMP, supra note 2, pt. II, § 5-403. 
466. [d., pt. II, § 5-304(A)(2). 
467. [d., pt. I at 202; pt. II, § 5-303(A)(2). 
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former but not to the latter, the presence of many other provisions 
favorable to the Forest Area landholder makes it unlikely that this 
"flaw" will be viewed by the courts as fatal. Overall, Forest Area 
landowners have appreciably more land use options than do Preser-
vation Area owners. Residential development is allowed in the 
Forest Area at the specified density level of one unit per 15.8 acres, 
above and beyond the present housing level. In addition, residents 
who qualify under the "Piney" exception468 will be allowed to con-
struct dwelling units on lots of 3.2 acres469 or more. Waivers may 
also be granted in the case ofhardship.470 Furthermore, a landowner 
may apply for a special development permit.471 Moreover, if the land 
the owner intends to build on is too special to allow any exceptions to 
the rules, then the Plan provides for the clustering of residential 
development rights. 472 Under this provision, the Commission would 
effectively give the landowner the right to transfer his development 
rights within the Forest Area, away from his land, to designated 
cluster zones of at least 500 contiguous acres. The Plan provides that 
these acres will be suitable for building under the environmental pro-
tection standards of the CMP as well as accessible to areas of exist-
ing growth and development.473 This cluster zone provision must, 
therefore, be considered a mitigating factor when assessing the 
burden of the Forest Area landowner. 
As to land uses other than development, no activities presently in 
use in the Forest Area are prohibited under the Plan. Forest Area 
land may be put to such uses as low- and high-intensive recreational 
uses, agricultural commercial establishments, and roadside retail 
sales and service establishments,474 as well as to uses comparable to 
those allowed in the Preservation Area.475 Landowners may also ap-
ply for permission to expand the scope of uses to include others 
which are compatible with the special character of the land.476 In 
light of these factors, it appears likely that, despite the unavailability 
of PDC's, a court would find that a Forest Area claimant can put his 
land to some reasonable use. 
As one moves down the four-tiered density limitation477 scale, the 
plausibility of a "lack of reasonable use" claim sharply diminishes. In 
468. See supra text and note at note 159. 
469. CMP, supra note 2, pt. II, § 5-303(A). 
470. See supra text and notes at notes 438-40. 
471. See supra text and notes at notes 431-37. 
472. CMP, supra note 2, pt. II, § 5-310. 
473. [d., pt. I at 203; pt. II, § 5-310. 
474. [d., pt. II, §§ 5-303(A)(6),(7), 5-303(B)(5),(6). 
475. See supra text at note 149. 
476. See supra note 427. 
477. See supra note 457. 
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Rural Development Areas,478 residential development is presently 
allowed at a level of one dwelling unit for every 3.2 acres.479 In the 
future, development is likely to be at an even higher level, as the 
CMP provides that these areas will serve as extensions of the 
Regional Growth Areas once the latter have been substantially 
developed.480 Furthermore, the variety of permissible land uses in 
Rural Development Areas exceeds that of the Forest Area, allowing 
greater industrial and commercial development, thereby insuring 
the opportunity for every landowner to realize a reasonable return 
on his investment. 
The Regional Growth Area landholder also has no real basis to 
claim that his land has been "taken" by overregulation. No land uses 
are expressly prohibited in this area. Development is allowed at a 
base level of one to three and one-half units per acre with the option 
for higher density development available through the purchase of 
PDC'S.481 There is no evidence of significant downzoning482 specifi-
cally to create a market for the PDC's, as the base density level is 
certainly not unreasonable. The density level set is still much higher 
than the average degree of development existing in the area prior to 
the Plan's implementation.483 Therefore, to require the purchase of 
PDC's to further develop one's land imposes no great burden on the 
landowner. He is not compelled to buy these development rights, as 
he is free to develop within the zoning limitations. Also, in general, 
the landowner will only purchase the PDC's if they are cheaper than 
purchasing additionalland.484 The purchaser, then, along with the 
Preservation Area landowner, benefits economically from this TDR 
system. Further benefits may also be derived by proximity to the 
natural wealth of the Pinelands core.485 Some potential benefits are 
intangible, such as aesthetic pleasure; whereas other benefits are 
478. See supra text and notes at notes 167-69. 
479. CMP, supra note 2, pt. II, § 5-306. 
480. [d., pt. II, §§ 5-501 to 5-503. Regional Growth Areas are zoned at one to three and one-
half units per acre. See supra text and notes at notes 170-74. 
481. CMP, supra note 2, pt. II, § 5-308(A)(2). 
482. Downzoning is a term meaning the intentional lowering of development intensity levels 
by a change in zoning regulations. See Williamson, Constitutional and Judicial Limitations on 
the Community's Power to Downzone, 12 URB. LAW. 157 (1980). 
483. Many commentators warn about the added complications which come with downzon-
ing. See, e.g., Schlaes, From an Economic Perspective: Who Pays for the Transfer of Develop-
ment Rights?, in Rose, supra note 181, at 330. The basic issue of the constitutionality of such 
action would have to be considered. In this case, because every Regional Growth Area land-
owner is being treated uniformly, it is likely that such downzoning would be judicially 
approved. An unwanted result of downzoning would be that those landowners "caught in the 
squeeze" will blame the TDR system and cooperative buyers and sellers are critical to the suc-
cess of TDR's. 
484. Schlaes, supra note 483, at 332-33. 
485. Admittedly, such benefits will vary according to the location of each parcel of land. 
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more easily recognizable, such as increased land values.486 Overall, 
the benefits to the Regional Growth Area landowner appear to far 
outweigh any burdens placed on him by the Pinelands Plan or the 
PDC Program. 
The end result of this examination of the Protection Area stand-
ards is a determination that the regulation of each land use planning 
area leaves the landowner with much more than the minimal require-
ment of reasonable beneficial use. Property rights may be exercised 
in several ways: through compliance with the CMP standards; by ap-
plying for a permit or waiver; or through the clustering of develop-
ment rights or the purchase of PDC's. Under these conditions, it 
would be the rare case in which a landowner could show that he had 
been totally deprived of the reasonable use of his property. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The New Jersey Pinelands is widely recognized as an environmen-
tal asset of national importance. It is a vast, untouched expanse rich 
in natural resources set precariously in the middle of the urbanized 
Northeast. The tremendous development pressures emanating in 
southern New Jersey-particularly from the suburbanization of Phil-
adelphia, the advent of retirement communities in Ocean County, 
and the booming gambling trade in Atlantic City-threaten the sanc-
tity of the Pinelands region. Recognizing these threats, bold, aggres-
sive action was taken to protect the Pinelands' unique ecosystem, 
while at the same time providing for the future hQusing needs of the 
area. The result was the creation of the country's first national 
reserve-the Pinelands National Reserve. 
The National Reserve system is a cooperative effort involving 
federal, state, and local governments. It combines limited public ac-
quisition with comprehensive land use controls. The key element in 
the system is a regional regulatory master plan-a comprehensive 
set of restrictive standards devised particularly for the region to 
which all local plans must conform. By this use of police power 
regulations, a state can address its major environmental concerns 
and responsibly plan for the future to a degree previously possible 
only through the expense of public acquisition. 
The master plan for the Pinelands National Reserve is the 
Pinelands Comprehensive Management Plan. The Plan is, in es-
sence, divided along geographic lines into two broad regulatory 
schemes: in the remote and vulnerable interior of the Pinelands (the 
486. Schlaes, supra note 483, at 334. 
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Preservation Area), virtually all new development is prohibited; in 
the surrounding portions (the Protection Area), less stringent 
regulations encourage development in those areas where the adverse 
environmental effect will be minimal. In addition to specific land use 
and development restriction standards, the Plan includes several 
provisions which allow for exceptions to the standards set. Some ex-
ceptions, such as permits and waivers, apply when conformance 
would cause hardship; whereas others, such as housing development 
exceptions for long-time residents, are included because the history 
and culture of the Pinelands demand it. These provisions are an at-
tempt to lighten the burden placed by the restrictions on individual 
landholders, particularly on those owners in the Preservation Area. 
An additional and innovative attempt to alleviate the burden on 
the most strictly regulated landowners was made by including a pro-
vision for the use of transferable developmentxights (TDR's). Land-
owners in the Preservation Area who, under the Plan, have been 
deprived of the right to develop their own land are allotted a 
specified number of development "credits." These development 
credits can be sold on the open market to owners in designated por-
tions of the Protection Area. By this transaction, the purchaser-
landowner gains bonus development rights to be applied to his prop-
erty; the seller-landowner receives dollar value for the development 
rights which would otherwise go unused on his land. Thus, in effect, 
the TDR's allow the strictly regulated landowners to share in the in-
creasing value of tliat Pinelands property which need not be 
restricted as severely as their own. 
Despite this novel use of TDR's to mitigate the burden of regula-
tion, landowners have already gone to the courts with their claims 
that their land has been "taken" in violation of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. The line between valid regulation under the 
police power and an unconstitutional "taking" has for years been 
somewhat unclear. Since 1926, when Justice Holmes stated in Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that regulation could "go too far" and 
result in a "taking," courts have been struggling with the question of 
just when the unconstitutional line is crossed. The modern "taking" 
analysis appears to focus on two issues: (1) is the goal being pursued 
by use of the police power in the interest of the public health, safety 
and welfare?; and (2) is the degree of interference caused by the 
regulation such that the regulated owner retains the reasonable 
beneficial use of his property? Only an affirmative finding as to both 
these questions will lead a court to hold that no "taking" has oc-
curred. 
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Most regulations will not fail the first prong of the "taking" test. 
The scope of goals properly achievable by use of police powers has 
been continuously broadened by the courts over the years. Thus, 
goals which twenty years ago would have been invalidated as being 
more appropriate to eminent domain will now most likely be upheld. 
Supporting this trend is the presumption in favor of legislative deter-
minations which has left many a "taking" claimant with too heavy a 
burden to bear. A property owner with a "taking" claim may, 
however, also challenge the means used to attain the goal. If the 
means are unreasonable or arbitrary, the regulation will be rendered 
invalid. Here, too, however, the claimant has the burden to rebut, as 
there is a presumption in favor of reasonableness, particularly if the 
regulation is part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme. 
The case law suggests that the focus of the modern courts' "tak-
ing" analysis is the second prong of the test-the degree of in-
terference caused by the challenged regulation. The standard estab-
lished by the Supreme Court as the threshold for constitutionality is 
"reasonable beneficial use." However, just what constitutes 
reasonable use is as yet unsettled, as determinations are made on a 
case-by-case basis. The pattern which emerges from the case law is 
that courts focus on the degree to which a property owner's 
economic expectations have been frustrated. Only if an owner is 
unable to put his land to any reasonable use, and so, therefore, can-
not accrue a reasonable return, will the interference be so great as to 
constitute a "taking." 
As for TDR's, a recent Supreme Court decision indicates that their 
function is not to provide a restricted landowner with just compensa-
tion. Rather, the value of TDR's is a factor to be considered when 
evaluating whether an owner has retained the reasonable use of his 
property. Thus, where TDR's are determined to be a valuable asset 
to the landholder, the Court suggests that the existence ofthe TDR's 
is an indication that reasonable use remains. Whether or not TDR's 
are sufficiently valuable in any given situation depends on the 
mechanics of the particular TDR system involved. 
The Pinelands National Reserve was created in an attempt to pre-
vent the destruction of a national treasure while simultaneously 
respecting the property rights of individual landholders. The goals of 
the Reserve system are proper, even laudable. The means-a com-
prehensive management plan-is judicially recognized as reasonable 
and should therefore be shown deference. The Pinelands Plan, hav-
ing been devised following a thorough examination of the region's 
natural, cultural, and economic climate, is carefully drafted to 
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preserve the reasonable beneficial use of each individual's property. 
Furthermore, the inherent flexibility in the Plan reduces the 
possibility that it will be applied in an unconstitutional way. 
As for the pioneer application of the TDR concept, such a com-
prehensive land use plan appears to be the ideal vehicle for their use. 
The regional forum provides the necessary receiving lots and poten-
tial buyers; the booming economy of the Pinelands region provides 
the demand for more development; and clear transfer procedures 
and an educated public will encourage the utilization of the system. 
In borderline cases, where the strictest regulation might arguably 
leave the landowner with uncertain reasonable use of his property, 
the value of the TDR's will serve to mitigate his burden and ensure a 
reasonable return. Thus, the Pinelands Plan and the Pinelands 
Development Credit Program appear to be on constitutionally firm 
ground. 
